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From the Co-Chairs  
Dear Colleagues, Members, and Friends of the Middle East Committee:  
This Issue of the Middle East Review, our Committee’s regular publication of legal news and 
developments from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, is the third since the 2016-17 
American Bar Association bar year. Since that time, and under the leadership of the Committee’s past 
co-chairs, Hon. Delissa Ridgway, Jennifer Ismat, and Hdeel Abdelhady, the Middle East Review has 
become a publication of record for news and ideas about rule of law, human rights, and commercial and 
business law developments in the region. In that spirit, the Middle East Committee humbly publishes 
this Issue 3, for your reading pleasure. The issue contains intellectually stimulating and informative 
articles on the Middle East by academics and practitioners in, and on, the MENA region.  
The Middle East Review (MER) is a regular publication with articles from students, academics and 
practitioners on legal developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The 
contributors have written intellectually stimulating and informative articles, and we are grateful for 
their patience with us in the extended process of getting Issue 3 to publication. 
The Committee is currently soliciting articles for a further issue of the Middle East Review for the 2019-
2020 ABA bar year, which will be Middle East Review Issue No. 4. We encourage anyone who is thinking 
of writing on legal developments in the region to submit their article for this publication. We also invite 
anyone interested in getting more involved in the activities of the Middle East Committee to contact us 
at kurzcooper@att.net (Daniel Cooper) and drhurwitz22@gmail.com (Deena Hurwitz), and to join our 
monthly Committee conference calls, held on the second Wednesday of each month at 11am Eastern.  
(Reach out if you need assistance finding the dial-in details.) 
Again, we want to express our deep gratitude to the contributors to this issue and to the editorial team 
for their hard work and dedication in making this issue of the MER a reality, and want to especially 
appreciate the immediate past Committee co-chairs, Lisa Ridgway and Jennifer Ismat, for their guidance 
and support in making this such a worthwhile publication. 
-Daniel R. Cooper & Deena R. Hurwitz 
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From the Editor  
Welcome to this, the third issue of Middle East Review (“MER”) a publication of the Middle East 
Committee of the American Bar Association Section of International Law. We are pleased to share with 
Committee members and friends this excellent, if somewhat belated, edition of the MER.  
The content of this issue reflects the diversity of our members and the countries, developments, and 
issues within the broad geographic and substantive scope of the Middle East Committee. The issue’s 
articles are wide-ranging, academic, consequential and thought-provoking in every regard. 
 
We invite Committee members and other readers to submit feedback on this issue of the MER, as well as 
articles and suggestions for future issues to the Middle East Committee’s co-Chair, Daniel Cooper, at 
kurzcooper@att.net, and the Committee’s Vice Chair for Publications, Kelly Blount, at 
kellyblount85@gmail.com.  
 
We hope you enjoy this issue of the MER. Please note that the views and opinions expressed in the articles 
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions, policies or positions of the 
American Bar Association or any of its constituent entities, including the Middle East Committee. 
 
-Daniel R. Cooper, Editor in Chief (Issue No. 3) 
About the Middle East Committee 
The Middle East Committee is part of the American Bar Association’s Section of International Law. 
Members of the Committee have a professional and/or personal interest in law and events concerning 
the Middle East and North Africa. The geographic scope encompasses Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen.  
 
The Committee conducts regular substantive conference calls with members, maintains an active email 
list with news and updates, and organizes panels for Section events. It has also helped organize and 
support various Rule of Law/judicial reform initiatives, including for Afghanistan, Iraq, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. Recent teleconferences have addressed the refugee crisis and Responsibility to Protect in Syria 
and Lebanon, political and security developments in Egypt and Libya, application of US employment law 
in the Middle East, and US and international sanctions, among other issues.  
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HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
Need for a New Convention on Non-International Armed Conflict: 
The Agreement on Detainees Between Warring Parties in Yemen 
 
Mohammed Alshuwaiter, LLM1 
Since the conflict violently erupted in Yemen in 2014, the warring parties finally came together to 
reach the Stockholm Agreement on December 14, 2018. The Agreement marks the first success after 
several unsuccessful rounds of negotiations. This United Nations (UN) brokered agreement tackles three 
central issues: first, under the supervision of the UN, the warring parties withdraw their troops to outside 
a number of port cities:  the cities of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa; second, an agreement on the 
exchange of prisoners, detainees, missing persons, arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappeared persons, 
and those under house arrest, which I will refer to as the “detainees,” and; finally, a statement of 
understanding on Taiz, where a joint committee will be formed for further negotiations on the city, which 
still remains under siege by the Houthis.  
 
Still, the war in Yemen is entering its fifth year.  It has been described by a September 2018 UN 
statement as the world's worst humanitarian crisis.  The UN posits that there are “22.2 million in need of 
assistance, 8.4 million people severely food insecure, and a further 10 million that could fall under the 
same category by the end of the year.” 2 According to a report by an internationally-recognized non-
governmental organization, all parties to the conflict have violated international humanitarian law (IHL) 
and committed war crimes. 3 Those violations include indiscriminate targeting of civilians and civilians’ 
objects, recruiting children, carrying out summary executions and arbitrary detention, and practicing 
torture. Since the start of the conflict, there is a massive number of detainees living in critical conditions 
in Yemen. This has compelled national, multilateral, and international human rights organizations, 
including the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to respond.  
 
The conflict in Yemen has shed a light on the urgent need for an updated international convention 
to address modern non-international armed conflict (NIAC) situations. The conflict in Yemen is an 
illustration of how current warfare operates, intertwining both domestic and international parties. The 
disconnect in regulating most current domestic conflicts arises because they are considered NIACs, 
however, they are still governed by the four Geneva Conventions, which mainly focus on IACs.  
 
In 1949 when the Geneva Convention was initially adopted, it was intended mainly to regulate 
international armed conflict (IAC), as a result of World War II. In 1977 two additional protocols were 
adopted, Additional Protocol I (API), relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts 
 
1 Mohammed Al-Shuwaiter is a legal consultant who has provided consulting services to a number of international 
organizations, including the World Bank. He is an LLM graduate in international law from American University’s Washington 
College of Law. 
2 UN News. “Yemen: Tackling the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.” September 24, 2018. 
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1020232> 
3 Hum. Rights. Watch, “Yemen: Events of 2017.” (Jan. 7, 2019) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-
chapters/yemen> 
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and Additional Protocol II (APII), relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed 
conflicts. However, these additional protocols do not address the legal status of the detainees in NIAC. 4 
This disconnect with modern conflict creates a void in regulating the detention and exchange of prisoners 
in NIAC and leaves these groups at the mercy of the most violent aspects of warfare.  
 
Although reaching the Stockholm Agreement is an achievement, there remain serious 
humanitarian law lacunae regarding detention in NIAC. First, the authority of internment in NIAC is very 
controversial because of the absence of rules under the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols. However, the ICRC adopted the opinion that internment, or deprivation of liberty, is an 
inherent power in customary IHL, meaning the non-state actor is authorized to detain in NIAC.5 Second, 
the term “prisoners” in the Stockholm Agreement leads to confusion, the term of “prisoner of war” 
(POW) is only used in IAC. The POWs have the privilege to not be prosecuted for taking a direct part in 
hostilities. As the UN identifies the Yemeni Conflict as “NIAC,” it should use the term “internees” or 
“detainees” instead of “prisoners,” to avoid confusion with the status of POW’s. The APII, which deals 
with NIAC only, did not use the term “prisoners,” it used the formulation “deprived of their liberty, 
interned or detained.” 6 Further, the Stockholm Agreement deals with both foreign Yemeni combatants as 
well as civilians, adding to the complexity and precariousness of the applicable law in wartime.   
 
The Stockholm Agreement also leaves certain questions open. These include, what will become 
of the Yemeni detainees reported by the UN in foreign countries, for example in Saudi Arabia and in the 
UAE detention centers, foreign detainees in Aden; or mercenaries of other nationalities fighting alongside 
with Houthis? The lack of clear categories of the status of detainees is also a reflection of the confusion in 
the conflict’s characterization. To avoid dispute over its legitimacy, the Stockholm Agreement appears to 
have purposely not identified which party represents the de jure “government” and which represents the 
de facto “authority.” However, UNSCR 20451 endorses the Stockholm Agreement as between the State, 
the Yemeni government, versus the non-state Houthis. 7  
 
The legal status of detainees in the Stockholm Agreement is unclear as to whether they are POWs 
or NIAC detainees. This ambiguity is partly attributable to the non-updated international conventions on 
NIAC that concern detainees.  This paper will adopt the UN terms of reference and use the term the 
“Yemeni Government” to refer to President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi’s government, and “Houthis’ 
authority”  to refer to the Houthis. To illustrate this complexity, the ICRC stated:  “Identifying the legal 
framework governing internment becomes particularly complicated in NIACs with an extraterritorial 
element, i.e. those in which the armed forces of one or more State, or of an international or regional 
 
4  The APII did include how the detainees should be treated, but it did not clarify the legality of being detained. 
5  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). “Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges.” Opinion 
Paper, November 2014, 7, (Feb. 25, 2019) <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conflict-basic-rules-and-
challenges> 
6 Additional Protocol II art.5, Jun. 8 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
7 Houthis is a Yemen Zaydi-Shia religious group, established early 1990, named after a family call (al-Houthi) claiming they 
are descendants of the Prophet Mohammed, which gives them the right to rule. 2004 was the first time of armed confrontation 
between Houthis militias and the Sunni Yemeni government. What is the Houthi Movement? <https://archive.org/about/ 
https://web.archive.org/web/20141006141708/http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-
geopolitics/commentaries/backgrounder/what-houthi-movement> 
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organization, fight alongside the armed forces of a host State, in its territory, against one or more 
organized non-State armed groups.” 8 
 
This article reviews the legal basis of the agreement from the both the IHL and the IHRL 
perspectives as they are referred to in the Stockholm Agreement’s preamble and supported by the UN and 
the ICRC. To review the agreement, a brief introduction of the conflict is needed to understand the 
context and clarify the laws governing the exchange of detainees. 
  
 Background 
 
Yemen’s modern history has been marked by several conflicts. However, the current conflict 
might be the most devastating.  This conflict began on September 21, 2014, when the Houthis 
(Ansarullah) 9 took over the capital of Yemen, Sana’a.10 Later, in February, 2015 the President of Yemen, 
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had been placed under house-arrest by the Houthis, fled to the former 
capital of southern Yemen, Aden. 11 From Aden, Hadi withdrew his resignation and reclaimed his 
presidency saying: the resignation occurred under the Houthis pressure. Hadi also declared Aden as a 
temporary capital.12 The Houthis pursued Hadi to Aden, attempting to extend their control over southern 
Yemen. The Houthis’ warplanes bombed the Presidential Residency in Aden and took over the city.13 
Hadi then fled to Saudi Arabia seeking its support. On March 26, 2015, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia 
launched a military campaign to restore President Hadi to power.14 
 
The Houthis’ alliance with the former President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, formed a de facto authority 
in Sana’a, which today controls most of northern Yemen. Saleh, who compared ruling Yemen to 
“dancing on the Heads of Snakes,” tried to use the Houthis to retaliate against those who had removed 
him from power and help him take it back.15  For the Houthis, on the other hand, Saleh was the enemy of 
their enemies. So, they allied with him to benefit from his strong connection with the military 
commanders and tribal leaders that would assist them to march on Sana’a and take over the capital. And 
that is initially what happened. However ultimately, the alliance did not last, and the Houthis assassinated 
Saleh on December 4, 2017. Hadi came to power after the 2011 political crisis as a result of a political 
settlement reached by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, sponsored by a group of ten 
countries including the five members of the Security Council, and the GCC. The political settlement 
 
8 Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Opinion Paper, 
November 2014, 7. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conflict-basic-rules-and-challenges> 
9 Several Islamic groups have used the name of Ansarullah for their movement, including the Houthis. Ansarullah is an 
Arabic-Islamic terms means the Supporters of God. Quranic (3:52) 
10 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State.” Chatham House, 21 (2016). 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-05-25-yemen-stemming-rise-of-chaos-
state-salisbury.pdf>  
11 Mohamed Ghobari and Mohammed Mukhashaf. “Yemen’s Hadi flees to Aden and says he is still president.” Reuters, 
February 21, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/yemens-hadi-flees-to-aden-and-says-he-is-still-
president-idUSKBN0LP08F20150221> 
12 MEE and agencies. “Yemen’s Hadi withdraws resignation, as UN pushes for dialogue.” Middle East Eye, February 24, 
2015. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemens-hadi-withdraws-resignation-un-pushes-dialogue>  
13 Id. at 25. 
14 Id. 
15 Zachary Laub. “Yemen in Crisis.” Council on Foreign Relations, April 19, 2016. 
<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis> 
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stipulated that it should be followed by a public referendum, which occurred on February 21, 2012.16 
Hadi continues to be seen as the recognized President of Yemen, although he has limited control on the 
ground and is exiled in Saudi Arabia.  Further, the Houthis’ de facto authority failed to obtain 
international recognition though they have control over the capital Sana’a and other governorates.17  
  
The Yemeni government has been operating in exile, based in Saudi Arabia, and has general 
control over some of the “liberated” parts in northern and southern Yemen. Because of the instability in 
Aden, the Yemeni government has been back and forth between Riyadh and Aden, but in October 2018 
the Yemeni government began to operate out of Aden, while President Hadi is still in Riyadh. An 
additional layer of complexity comes into play as regional powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates - UAE) use the Houthis, Yemeni government, and other forces to fight a proxy war at the 
expense of the Yemeni population, causing a humanitarian disaster.  
   
  Characterization of the Yemeni Conflict  
 
It is important, before defining the Yemeni conflict to clarify that the right to war, jus ad bellum, 
is separate from the law of war (jus in bello). Meaning that having the right to wage a war under the UN 
Charter does not allow any warring party to violate IHL. The characterization of the conflict determines 
the applicable laws and conventions. However, it is more complicated to characterize modern conflicts by 
the IHL standards that have been established by the four Geneva Conventions in 1949. IHL recognizes 
only two types of conflicts. The first one occurs between states and is qualified as an “international 
armed conflict” (IAC), and the second occurs within a state, between the state and non-state actors 
(NIAC) and is categorized as a “non-international armed conflict.” Common Article 2 to the four Geneva 
Conventions defines an international armed conflict as combat occurring between two or more high 
contracting parties, which refer to States that are party to the Conventions.18 Common Article 3 to the 
four Geneva Conventions describes a non-international armed conflict, as a one that happens “in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” 19 Accordingly, the parties to the conflict and the 
concept of statehood constitute the core of the characterization of the conflict.20 The four Geneva 
Conventions in 1949 were mainly concerned with inter-state conflict, as a result of World War II. 
Therefore, they did not elaborate much on non-international armed conflicts. However, in post-WWII, 
most conflicts have been non-international.21 Seeking to fill this gap, the Additional Protocols of the four 
Geneva Conventions were adopted. The Additional Protocol II relates to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts.22  
 
 
16 Salisbury, supra note 9, at 14. 
17 S.C. Res. 2216 (April 14, 2015). 
18 Geneva Convention IV art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 286, 288.  
19 Id. at 3. 
20 Int’l Comm. of Red Cross. “Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field.” August 12, 1949:  Commentary of 2016: Article 2: Application of the Convention, §221 (2016). Article 2: 
Application of the Convention (Feb. 25, 2019). <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC1257F7D00
36B518#15>    
21 Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict 19 (Paola Gaeta & Salvatore Zappala eds., 
2016).  
22 Id. at 20.  
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With that in mind, under what definition does the Yemeni conflict fit? Foreign intervention in 
Yemen’s conflict makes it hard to characterize it from an IHL perspective. The coalition led by Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE supporting the Yemeni government, and Iranian logistical support smuggling 
weapons to the Houthis authority, can be seen as a trigger of IAC.  
 
Turning now to the UN and the international committee, how do they characterize the Yemeni 
conflict? According to UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015) on Yemen, the intervention of the 
coalition led by Saudi Arabia, at the moment, does not trigger the threshold of what is defined as an 
international armed conflict; rather it is considered support on the side of Yemen’s legitimate government 
against non-state actors, the Houthis/Saleh forces. The recognition of President Hadi by the UN allows 
his government, under Article 51 of the Charter of the UN, to request foreign military aid.23 Furthermore, 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter exceptionally authorizes states to use force, in particular in the case of self 
or collective defense, or when the use of force is authorized by the Security Council, or by the request of 
another state.24 Currently, the UN continues to identify the conflict in Yemen as “NIAC” between “pro-
government forces” against the “de facto authority” Houthi forces.25 However the UN panel of experts, in 
its legal framework, underlines that viewing the Yemeni conflict as a “binary conflict only between the 
Government and the Houthis” leads to a misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict.26  The UAE has 
the overall control of the Security Forces and other troops in South Yemen.  The UAE also supports the 
Southern Transitional Council, which became a challenge for the Government declaring a state of 
emergency in Aden and clashed heavily with government forces. 27 This additional layer of intervening 
forces and outside actors will further impact and complicate the conflict.  Moreover, the latest UNSCR 
2451 (2018) continues to describe the conflict in Yemen as a NIAC, between the State (the government), 
and a non-State (Houthis).28   
 
Laws Governing Detention in the Yemeni Conflict 
 
 The Stockholm Agreement indicates that its legal sources and references are:  Islamic Law, IHL, 
IHRL, and the domestic law of Yemen. 
 
I. IHL 
 
Characterizing the Yemeni Conflict as a NIAC means that the conflict is governed by two main 
provisions, Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions 1949, and Additional Protocol II (APII) 
of 1977.29 According to the Geneva Convention (IV), relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
 
23 Geneva Academy, Non-international armed conflicts in Yemen, <http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-
armed-conflicts-in-yemen#collapse1accord>  
24 John Cerone, Misplaced Reliance on the “Law of War,” 14 NEW ENG. J. of Int’l and Comp. L. 57, 59 (Fall 2007). 
25. U.N. General Assembly. “Situation of Human Rights in Yemen: Rep. of United Nations High Commissioner.” ¶5, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/39/43 (August 17, 2018). 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23479&LangID=E> 
26 Id. at ¶23.  
27 U.N. General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen: Rep. of United Nations High Commissioner, ¶5,15, and 23, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/43 (August 17, 2018). 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23479&LangID=E> 
28 U.N. Security Council. “The Situation in the Middle East.” S/RES/2451 (2018). <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2451> 
29 Sylvain Vite, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 
Int’l Rev. of the Red Cross 69, 83 (2009) (Jan. 5, 2019), <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf>  
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Time of War, unlawful confinement is a grave breach. 30 Also, the APII governs deprivation of liberty in 
NIAC and indicates fundamental rights for those not participating in hostilities. However, the concept of 
detention in NIAC is one of the most urgent issues that requires updating IHL. IHL distinguishes between 
two categories of people during armed conflicts. First, combatants, who take direct part in hostilities, also 
referred to as fighters.  Those combatants either belong to an official armed group or belong to organized 
non-state actors that take part in the armed conflict. The second group of people is civilians which are 
defined negatively; they do not take part in hostilities. This group is entitled to protection, as long as they 
do not take direct part in military operations.  However, the IHL allows the detention of civilians during 
the armed conflict based on a very strict legal standard: “imperative reasons of security.” 31 For example, 
the “internment may not be resorted to for the sole purpose of interrogation or intelligence gathering, 
unless the person in question is otherwise deemed to represent a serious security threat. Similarly, 
internment may not be resorted to in order to punish a person for past activity, or to act as a general 
deterrent to the future activity of another person.” 32 
 
II. IHRL 
 
IHRL provides protections of individuals’ liberty in cases where IHL safeguards are insufficient; 
these treaties offer important guarantees protecting civilians from arbitrary detention.  Yemen is a state 
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 33 Yemen and all the countries 
participating in the coalition are parties to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 34 Article 9 of the ICCPR protects individuals from arbitrary 
detention.35  The Human Rights Committee has expressed that the IHRL rules, such as ICCPR, apply 
along with the IHL rules during wartime. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has confirmed this 
position, stressing that: “the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does 
not cease in times of war.”36 This means that both IHL and IHRL apply to the conflict in Yemen. 
 
III. The domestic law of Yemen 
 
IHRL, as a matter of sovereignty, does not intervene with states’ rights regulating domestic laws. 
This rule is supported by the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect to Kosovo.37 However, this rule is not absolute. IHRL specifies certain legal standards and 
minimum guarantees that states should respect and consider when enacting their laws.  In addition, the 
ICJ held that IHL regulates state detention activity.38  In non-international armed conflict, states have no 
 
30 Geneva Convention IV art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 286, 288. 
31 Basic Rules and Challenges (ICRC) supra note 4, 9. 
32 Id. 
33 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984. 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en> 
34 Id. 
35 G. A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
36 International Commission of Jurists, Legal Commentary on the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention in armed 
conflict 3, (Jul. 31, 2017) <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Universal-Commentary-WGAD-
PrincGuideArmedConflict-Advocacy-2015-ENG.pdf> 
37 Jelena Pejic, Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/ administrative detention in armed conflict and other 
situations of violence, 87 Int’l Rev. of the Red Cross 375, 442 (2005) (Jul. 28, 2017) 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_858_pejic.pdf>   
38 Id.   
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right to establish laws on specific conduct that contradict expressly prohibited acts by international 
customary law, like arbitrary detention.39 Therefore, states should comply with the rules of IHRL and IHL 
when detaining any person in times of war.  As a general rule, domestic law also offers an important legal 
framework for detention in non-international armed conflict.40 The Yemeni Constitution’s Article 48 
guarantees all citizens personal freedom and prohibits arrest of individuals, unless such action is 
undertaken as part of a criminal case, which should be issued by a Prosecutor’s order.41 Moreover, the 
Yemeni Constitution assures that “No person may be imprisoned or detained in places other than those 
designated as such and governed by the law of prisons.”42 The Constitution prohibits the administrative 
authority from holding a person in custody over 24 hours without presenting him before the court.43 The 
prohibition of arbitrary detention is also established in the Yemeni Penal Code of 1994. Article 246 
outlaws arbitrary arrest without legal grounds and punishes any person who orders or participates in such 
practice with five years of imprisonment and has no statute of limitations.44 
 
Detention During the Conflict  
         
The question now is, how can this body of laws—both international and domestic—be applied in 
the absence of a capable and legitimate governmental authority in Yemen? Already, the judiciary system 
in Yemen had become largely defunct.45 An investigation by the Group of Experts, under the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR), has found that both warring parties have violated IHL and 
committed war crimes throughout the country, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, 
torture, and ill treatment. The Governments of Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia are 
responsible for hundreds of individuals been detained for perceived opposition to the Government of 
Yemen or the UAE. 46 The UAE also has detention facilities and secret prisons out of the Yemeni 
government’s control.  SAM, a Yemeni human right organization based in Geneva, has “documented 232 
informal prisons, 180 operated by Houthis group, 25 by UAE-funded forces, 15 by fighting groups 
affiliated to the legitimate government, and 11 by the government forces.” 47 
 
Exchanging Prisoners  
 
 It is not the first time that the Yemeni government and Houthis authority have swapped prisoners; 
both sides have done so via local mediators. However, this is the first time it has been carried out in such 
large-scale numbers, under UN and ICRS supervision. This agreement and these exchanges represent a 
step forward towards a peace agreement. Nevertheless, this important step should not prevent the 
reviewing of the legal framework of the Stockholm Agreement, and consideration of how it can be 
improved to better protect the detainees’ rights from further abuse and violence.  
 
Mixing Civilians with Combatants 
 
39 Id.   
40 Legal Commentary of the Right to Challenge the lawfulness of Detention, supra note 39, 17. 
41 Yemen [Constitution] 2001, Section 2, art. 48. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Yemen Pen. Code. bk. 9, ch. 2, art. 246. 
45 Supra 24 Note ¶68 <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23479&LangID=E> 
46 Id, art. 65 -73. 
47 SAM, Second Report on Human Rights Situation in Yemen during 2017 <http://www.samrl.org> (2017) (Des. 30, 2018) 
<https://www.samrl.org/sam-launches-its-second-report-on-human-rights-situation-in-yemen-during-2017/> 
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Several reports and witnesses have confirmed that the majority of the detainees are civilians.  
According to SAM, there are 3966 civilians in these prisons, including 3258 in Houthi prisons, 583 in 
UAE-backed security forces facilities, and 86 by armed groups affiliated to the legitimate government. 48 
The Houthis have employed the tactic of detention as a tool to suppress civilians who oppose their 
governmental control.49 According to the OHCHR, it has “received reports indicating that at least 124 
people, many believed to be civilians, were detained by the Popular Committees between 3 and 21 
November 2014 in unrecognized places of detention, including the Amran Sport Stadium and in private 
homes throughout the Amran Governorate. The circumstances of detention are not known, given that 
OHCHR was denied access to the detainees.”50 Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that Houthis 
authority in Yemen have been practicing arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in the capital, 
Sana’a.51 Mwatana, another Yemeni human rights organization, has asserted that arbitrary detention is 
systematically conducted by the Houthis. Mwatana reported 53 cases of arbitrary detention, including ten 
journalists, since the Houthis have taken over the capital Sana’a.52 A report by the Associated Press (AP) 
mentioned, according to the Abductees’ Mothers Union, that the Houthis have detained over 18,000 
civilians since 2014. 53  
 
The Stockholm Agreement does not address the issue of foreigners in the conflict; Yemeni 
officials have said there are Iranians, Somalians, and other mercenaries fighting alongside the Houthis. 
There are also other troops fighting on the side of the Yemeni government from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Sudan, and other nations.  How can the Stockholm Agreement deal with the multitude of nationalities in 
this conflict and are they all qualified as POW?  And how does the UN still consider this conflict to be a 
NIAC? 
 
Another problem is that the Stockholm Agreement does not include the Yemeni detainees who 
are being held in the UAE’s “black sites.” The Yemeni Government, according to the UN Panel of 
Experts, has no control over the secret prisons conducted by the UAE military forces. Further, the 
Stockholm Agreement does not include the Yemeni detainees in Saudi Arabia. Not to mention that the 
Saudi forces routinely arrest Yemeni fishermen and move them to detention centers in Saudi Arabia, 18 
of them are still missing.54 
 
Very importantly, the Stockholm Agreement did not provide any guarantees against “re-
detaining” detainees after they are finally released. And it does not provide any protections to stop the 
 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights., Situation of Human Rights in Yemen: Rep., ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/31 (Sep. 7, 
2015) (Jul. 28, 2017). 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/EN/HRBo
dies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/Documents/A_HRC_30_31_AEV.docx&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1> 
51 Hum. Rts. Watch, ‘Yemen: Arbitrarily Held by the Houthis’ www.hrw.org (Jul. 28, 2017) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/10/yemen-arbitrarily-held-houthis>  
52 Mwatana, They Are Not Here, www.mwatatna.org 25 (2016) (Jul. 28, 2017) 
<http://www.mwatana.org/sites/default/files/pdf/They%20are%20not%20here%20E.pdf> 
53 Michael, Maggie. ‘Ex-inmates: Torture rife in prisons run by Yemen rebels.’ December 7, 2018. 
<https://www.apnews.com/e32442a4c8c24acd9d362c433d5cd10e> 
54 U.N. General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen: Rep. of United Nations High Commissioner, ¶5,15, and 23, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/43 (August 17, 2018) (Des. 29, 2018) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23479&LangID=E> 
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continued practice of arbitrary detentions. The central accomplishment of the Stockholm Agreement is to 
treat the detainees as a card to prove the good will between the warring parties. However, it ignores the 
fundamental guarantees for justice; it does not provide any accountability of the perpetrators’ actions or 
offer any compensation to the victims nor guarantees that they will remain free.  
 
Conclusion  
 
From a legal perspective, how does the Stockholm Agreement acquiesce to the idea that civilians 
are used for exchange with combatants, and mixing all detainees, foreigners, and locals under one new 
category that does not exist in the four Geneva Conventions? The Yemeni conflict, among other 
conflicts, reflects a truth in modern armed conflicts that there is a deep-seated need to update 
international conventions on prisoners of war, detainees, and civilians that are imprisoned. Further, the 
conventions should also establish an international mechanism of enforcement.  This means that 
international legal bodies must address that modern conflicts no longer identify as clearly as international 
armed conflict, or non-international armed conflict.  The waters of modern conflict are muddy.  This 
murky status directly impacts those at the front lines of war, namely the combatants, but also those who 
get drawn into armed conflicts, the civilians, and both are detainees in need of protection under 
international humanitarian law.   
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ARBITRATION LAW 
The UAE’s New Arbitration Law 
Another step towards becoming a hub for dispute resolution  
 
Ghalib Muqbil Mahmoud55 
  
Background 
 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is recognized as a regional commercial and financial hub and a 
preferred location for international arbitration in a Middle East that continues to undergo rapid socio-
economic developments. The country’s two most politically and economically dominant emirates, Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai, have established so-called “offshore” courts in the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) 
and the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), respectively, in their endeavors to further attract 
international investors seeking an internationally familiar environment.  
The ADGM56 and DIFC courts practice common law, similar to a number of western jurisdictions, 
while the rest of the UAE operates under a civil law system where judicial precedents may be persuasive 
but are not binding on the court.57 As financial centers, both the ADGM and the DIFC have welcomed 
representative offices of internationally recognized arbitration centers, the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The DIFC established the DIFC-
LCIA Arbitration Centre in 200858 and the ADGM recently followed suit by welcoming the first 
representative office of the ICC in the Middle East in October 2018.59  In 1994, Dubai also set up the Dubai 
International Arbitration Center (DIAC) and in 1993 Abu Dhabi formed the Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Centre (ADCCAC) evidencing a long standing practice of resolving disputes 
by parties seeking arbitral remedies in the UAE.60  
While the UAE has opened its doors to well-known arbitral bodies for the benefit of regional and 
foreign investors, the UAE’s onshore courts have been adapting their approach toward arbitration in recent 
years. Since their establishment, the ADGM and the DIFC have been chosen as the legal seat in numerous 
arbitration clauses, partly in an endeavor to minimize perceived ratification challenges in the UAE onshore 
courts. Parties that ratified their awards through the UAE onshore courts have encountered additional 
 
55 Ghalib Mahmoud is an Associate at Hadef & Partners in Dubai, where he represents clients in complex litigation and 
mediation and international arbitration. He is licensed to practice before the courts of Dubai and the DIFC, and is admitted to 
the bars of New York and New Jersey. He has a bachelors degree with honors from Rutgers University and a law degree from 
Seton Hall University School of Law. 
56ADGM Courts Legislative Framework, <https://www.adgm.com/doing-business/adgm-courts/adgm-legal-framework/adgm-
courts-legal-framework/> (last accessed 20 February 2019).  
57Chief Justice Michael Hwang, “The Courts of the Dubai International Finance Centre — A Common Law island in a Civil 
Law ocean” 
 <https://www.difccourts.ae/2008/11/01/the-courts-of-the-dubai-international-finance-centre-a-common-law-island-in-a-civil-
law-ocean/> (last accessed 20 February 2019). 
58 DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre, <http://www.difc-lcia.org/why-was-the-difc-lcia-established.aspx> (last accessed 20 
December 2018).  
59 ADGM Arbitration Centre, <https://www.adgm.com/doing-business/adgm-courts/arbitration/adgm-arbitration-centre/> (last 
accessed 20 December 2018)  
60 Dubai International Arbitration Centre, <http://www.diac.ae/idias/aboutus/> (last accessed 20 December 2018).  
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periods of post-arbitration litigation before being able to execute their awards. Parties that wished to use 
the DIFC or ADGM as a conduit court for ratification of their awards would apply for an order seeking 
enforcement in the onshore courts from the DIFC or ADGM and pursuant to such order, file execution 
proceedings in the UAE onshore courts for enforcement purposes only.   
The UAE acknowledged that its arbitration laws must further develop in order for the UAE to 
become a recognized center for arbitration.61 After much anticipation, on May 15, 2018, the UAE published 
Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 (the “Arbitration Law”).62  The Arbitration Law repealed certain outdated 
provisions on arbitration as set out in the UAE Civil Procedures Law, Federal Law No. 11 of 199263 (the 
“Civil Procedures Law”) and adopted the Arbitration Law as the primary guide to arbitrations conducted 
and ratified in the UAE.64     
Previous Laws on Ratifying and Nullifying Arbitration Awards  
The UAE ratified the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Award (the “New York Convention”) in 2006 but in the absence of strict procedural guidelines 
the UAE was often not as effective, in practice, as certain other international fora.65  For decades, the Civil 
Procedures Law was the governing legal source relating to arbitral awards. Following enactment of the 
Arbitration Law, Articles 203 to 218 of the Civil Procedures Law, regarding arbitration, have been 
repealed.66 Article 236 states that,  
The provisions of the foregoing article67 shall apply to the awards of arbitrators made in a 
foreign country; the award of the arbitrators must have been made on an issue which is 
arbitrable under the law of the UAE, and capable of enforcement in the country in which it 
was issued.68  
The failure to repeal this article creates a level of potential uncertainty as to its current purpose and 
utility.69 One may argue that the failure to repeal Article 236 is intended to maintain the position that under 
UAE law the court may find grounds to nullify an award outside those grounds found in the Arbitration 
Law and the New York Convention. Article 238 of the Civil Procedures Law provides that, inter alia, 
Article 236 is without prejudice to provisions of international treaties to which the UAE is a 
party.70 Therefore, while the Arbitration Law has seemingly not addressed foreign arbitral awards, 
legislators have indicated that they do not wish to circumvent treaties, such as the New York Convention. 
The UAE courts will now also be provided a further opportunity to clarify the treatment of foreign arbitral 
 
61 Khaleej Times, “UAE on track to become a global arbitration centre,” <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/business/local/uae-
on-track-to-become-a-global-arbitration-centre> (last accessed 20 December 2018).  
62 Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 concerning Arbitration.  
63 Federal Law No. 11 of 1992, Civil Procedures Law. 
64 Supra note 7.   
65 Federal Decree No. 43 of 2006 regarding the United Arab Emirates Joining the Convention of New York on Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards available at <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/implementing+act+-
+united+arab+emirates> (last accessed 20 February 2019). 
66 Supra note 7.   
67 Article 235 of the Civil Procedures Law referenced the enforcement of foreign judgments and orders in the UAE.  
68 Supra note 8.   
69 Adrian Chadwick and Wesley Wood, The New Arbitration Law, available at 
<http://www.hadefpartners.com/News/335/The-New-Arbitration-Law> (last accessed 20 December 2018). 
70 Supra note 8. 
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awards in light of Cabinet Resolution No. 57 of 2018, concerning the Executive Regulations for the Civil 
Procedures Law (the “Regulations”), addressed below, which took effect on February 16, 2019. Prior to 
the Arbitration Law and the Regulations, under the Civil Procedures Law  a ratifying party would first have 
to file its claim for ratification before the relevant UAE Court of First Instance and then face possible 
appeal of any decision made by that court.71 The appeal would be heard de novo by the Court of Appeal.72 
Should a party seek to appeal the decision made by the relevant UAE Court of Appeal, the Court of 
Cassation could then be requested by a party to review the matter for errors of law.73 All parties in the UAE 
have an almost automatic right of appeal to all three tiers of the court system, i.e. First Instance, Appeal, 
and Cassation.74 A majority of litigants fully utilize the three-tiered appellate process, meaning that 
ratifying an arbitration award, prior to the Arbitration Law, could take a number of years from the date the 
parties received the arbitral award, before the prevailing party was able to file execution proceedings and 
realize any benefits. 
The Arbitration Law – Ratification and Nullification 
Under the new Arbitration Law, the circumstances have significantly changed. The Arbitration Law 
has incorporated the principles of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Model Law and has attempted to adopt aspects from other civil jurisdictions of the Arab 
World. The Arbitration Law provides for procedures that govern ad hoc arbitrations with a legal seat in the 
UAE and outlines new procedures for ratification, nullification and execution of arbitration awards. Since 
taking effect, the Arbitration Law has been applied by legal practitioners in relation to the ratification, 
nullification, and execution of arbitration awards. 
Article 2 of the Arbitration Law provides that the law is to apply to (1) arbitrations conducted within 
the UAE, unless the parties have agreed to a different governing law that does not conflict with the public 
order or morality laws of the UAE; (2) an international arbitration conducted outside the UAE where the 
parties sought to have the dispute  governed under UAE law; and (3) arbitrations arising from a dispute in 
respect of a legal relationship, contractual or otherwise, that is governed by UAE law, except as otherwise 
indicated by a specific provision.75 As noted above, Article 2 of the Arbitration Law does not include 
foreign arbitral awards.    
Under Article 55 of the Arbitration Law, a party wishing to ratify and execute an arbitral award 
must submit an application to the Head of the Court of Appeal, together with an original or certified copy 
of the award and a copy of the arbitration agreement, and certified Arabic translations of both documents.76 
Under Article 55(2) of the Arbitration Law, the Head of the Court of Appeal must then either ratify and 
order the execution of the award or deny ratification within sixty days from the date the application was 
submitted.77 The application for ratification is made ex parte, and after the award is ratified, the Court 
serves the opposing party with the ratified award.78 The opposing party then has the right to file a grievance 
 
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. Certain limitations exist to appealing a decision to the Court of Appeal and/or Court of Cassation, based on the value of 
the original claim before the court. 
75 Supra note 7. 
76 Supra note 7. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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or objection to the ratification of the award within thirty days following notification.79 It is unclear whether 
a grievance or objection is to be heard by the same judge who ratified the award. However any decision 
made by the Court of Appeal on the grievance or objection is then appealable to the Court of Cassation.80  
Since the Arbitration Law came into effect the courts have taken a “ratification-friendly” approach 
and the Head of the Court of Appeal has tended to ratify awards that have been presented within the 
allocated time under the law. However, in some circumstances, where parallel nullification proceedings 
have been filed by the opposing party the Head of the Court of Appeal has instead chosen to wait until 
nullification proceedings are completed at the Court of Cassation, before ratifying the award.   
Within thirty days of the date of service of the award, a party may file an application for nullification 
of an arbitral award.81  As discussed above, “the arbitral award may also be challenged at the time the Court 
of Appeal is considering an application for ratification.”82 Article 53 of the Arbitration Law states that the 
grounds for nullification include: that the arbitration is unenforceable; that a party lacked capacity to enter 
into the relevant arbitration agreement; and that the arbitral panel exceeded its jurisdiction.83 The Court of 
Appeal’s judgment on nullification may be appealed to the Court of Cassation, which is only permitted to 
review the matter for errors of law. “In addition, if the subject matter of the dispute is non-arbitral or if the 
award contravenes public order or the public morality of the UAE, then the [Court of] Appeal may of its 
own accord determine that the award is null and void.” 84  
Unless the nullity of an award is based on the non-existence, lapse, invalidity or unenforceability 
of the arbitration agreement, the arbitration agreement remains valid and enforceable. If the court does not 
nullify the award, the arbitration agreement remains valid.”85 It is therefore possible to recommence new 
arbitration proceedings, in certain circumstances, where the court finds grounds for nullification.86 Under 
the Civil Procedures Law, it was unclear whether the arbitration agreement itself remained valid where an 
award was made and then nullified. Additionally, under the Civil Procedures Law, claims for nullification 
and ratification are commenced at the Court of First Instance rather than the Court of Appeal.87 
The New Regulations and Foreign Arbitral Awards 
Article 3 of the New York Conventions states that, “There shall not be imposed substantially more 
onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which 
this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.”88 
In an attempt to seemingly overhaul and clarify several provisions of the Civil Procedures Law including 
the ratification of foreign arbitral awards, the UAE Ministerial Cabinet issued the Regulations which took 
effect on February 16, 2019.89 The Regulations go beyond mere clarifications of existing laws but have in 
fact amended and repealed certain provisions of the Civil Procedures Law. Article 86 of the Regulations 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Supra note 13.  
83 Id. 
84 Supra note 13. 
85 Id.  
86 Supra note 13.  
87 Supra note 8. 
88 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958), 
available at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/english (last accessed 26 January 2019). 
89 Cabinet Resolution No. 57 of 2018, concerning the Executive Regulations for Federal Law No. 11 of 1992. 
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specifically addresses the ratification of foreign arbitral awards. The Regulations state that the preceding 
Article 85, as it relates to enforcement of foreign judgments, “applies to arbitration awards rendered in a 
foreign state, provided that the award made by the arbitrators is with respect to an issue that is arbitrable in 
accordance with the law of the State [UAE] and capable of being executed (enforced) in the state where it 
was issued.”90  
The ratification of a foreign award, under the Regulations, must now proceed by way of an ex parte 
petition to the execution judge who must then issue an order within three days from the petition’s filing 
date.91 The execution judge must make a decision to either ratify the award or deny the petition. The 
opposing party shall then be served with the judgment ratifying the award and shall have the opportunity 
to appeal the judgment in accordance with the rules set forth in the Civil Procedures Law.92 As the 
Regulations have recently come into effect,93 legal practitioners have yet to see the practical implications 
of the Regulations before the courts. While practitioners await further interpretation by the courts and 
legislators, in reading the Regulations it is perceived that overturning the ratified award on appeal will be 
limited to specific grounds set forth in Article 85 of the Regulations. These grounds include that UAE 
Courts have exclusive jurisdiction, the correct governing law was applied, proper service was effectuated, 
the opposing party was provided an opportunity to be represented, the award or judgment does not conflict 
with an existing UAE judgment, and the award does not violate public policy.94 The Regulations do not 
provide the power to nullify the foreign award to the UAE Courts thus leaving the nullification process to 
the courts of the seat of the arbitration. This presumably remains in line with the New York Convention 
that expressly delegates the nullification of awards to the “competent court of the country which, or under 
the law of which, that award was made.”95   
Nonetheless, the addition of Article 86, months after the release of the Arbitration Law, may be an 
indication that legislators intended to emphasize the UAE’s intention to facilitate the ratification of foreign 
arbitral awards and not impose additional hurdles –in line with Article 3 of the New York Convention.96 
However, the Regulations largely remain untested and practitioners remain unclear as to several procedural 
faculties for the implementation of several articles in the Regulations and the courts adaptation and 
interpretation to the recent changes.     
The Arbitration Law in Practice 
 While the risk of nullification proceedings being filed by an opposing party is another potential 
challenge for prevailing parties, under the Arbitration Law UAE courts appear to appreciate the frustration 
of prevailing parties. Since the implementation of the Arbitration Law the courts have generally applied a 
“no-nonsense policy.” Nullification proceedings before the Court of Appeal have taken about one month 
from the date of service of nullification proceedings to the date the Court of Appeal renders its decision. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal has taken a conservative approach to nullifying an arbitration award and 
 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 At the time of writing this publication the Regulations were in effect for several days. Due to its temporal nature, the 
interpretation of the Regulations, and its practical implementation, is subject to change as specific cases and arguments are 
heard and appear before the respective courts; therefore some interpretations set forth in this publication, with respect to the 
Regulations, may be subject to change.   
94 Id.  
95 Supra note 34. 
96 Id.  
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has placed a heavy burden on the party seeking to nullify the award to prove its grounds for nullification. 
While the Court of Cassation appeal process may take a few months, submissions are limited to only one 
reply and one rejoinder and no new documents may be submitted.97  
 During the appeal period, the courts have also taken steps to protect the rights of the prevailing 
party in arbitration by granting orders for precautionary attachments against the opposing party’s assets, 
pursuant to Article 254 of the Civil Procedures Law.98 The precautionary attachment is presented to the 
Court of Summary Proceedings which enables a prevailing party to immediately attach assets of the 
opposing party pending adjudication of any underlying nullification proceedings and its respective 
appeals.99 The precautionary attachment is intended to ensure that an opposing party does not dissipate its 
assets or take actions to protect itself against judgment during the ratification and/or nullification 
proceedings.  
Further Steps to Becoming an Arbitration Hub 
 In furtherance of the UAE’s goal of becoming a recognized hub for international arbitration, 
legislators have also repealed potential criminal liability of arbitrators under the UAE Penal Code. Pursuant 
to Article 257 of the UAE Penal Code, as amended in 2016, arbitrators and party appointed experts were 
potentially criminally liable should their decisions or opinions be found to lack “neutrality and integrity.”100 
On October 8, 2018, Federal Decree No. 24 of 2018 came into force to amend Article 257 to specifically 
exclude criminal liability on arbitrators and party appointed experts.101 This carve out has lifted a 
significant concern of arbitrators and experts, commonly appointed by claimants and respondents in the 
course of an arbitration. Arbitrators and experts previously had concerns regarding potential criminal 
prosecution during arbitral proceedings or after the completion of an arbitration held in the UAE, should a 
disgruntled party decide to pursue a criminal complaint.102 Meanwhile, the UAE Minister of Economy has 
stated that he shall coordinate with the arbitration institutions in the UAE with a view to issuing a code of 
professional conduct for arbitrators.103 
   Given that the Arbitration Law is relatively new and therefore not fully tested, the courts and legal 
practitioners are treading gently and developing insights as to the effectiveness and implementation of the 
law. While parties previously favored the DIFC as a conduit court to ratify foreign arbitral awards, the 
introduction by the Government of Dubai of a Joint Judicial Committee104 has diverted a number of cases 
to the onshore Dubai courts on jurisdictional grounds, leaving affected parties with a dilemma regarding 
 
97 Supra note 8. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. (see also Supra note 34).  
100 Federal Law No. 7 of 2016, amended Article 257 of Federal Law No. 3 of 1987, the UAE Penal Code. 
101 Federal Decree No. 24 of 2018. 
102 Courtney Rothery and Robyn Waller, Imprisonment Fears Have Been Allayed for Arbitrators and Party-Appointed Experts 
Involved in UAE-Seated Arbitrations Following the Latest Amendment to Article 257 of the UAE Penal Code, 
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/765042/Arbitration+Dispute+Resolution/Imprisonment+fears+have+been+allayed+for+arbitrator
s+and+partyappointed+experts+involved+in+UAEseated+arbitrations+following+the+latest+amendments+to+Article+257+of
+the+UAE+Penal+Code> (last accessed 20 December 2018).  
103 Supra note 4.  
104 The Joint Judicial Committee was established by the Government of Dubai by Dubai Decree No. 19 of 2016. The 
Committee is made up of seven members consisting of four judges from the on-shore Dubai Courts and three judges from the 
DIFC Courts. The Committee’s mandate is to review and resolve “conflicts of jurisdiction” as they are raised by parties, 
between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts.   
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how to proceed with awards.105 The ADGM is a younger court and parties and practitioners are yet to see 
how the ADGM and onshore Abu Dhabi courts address jurisdictional challenges. The Arbitration Law has 
to some extent, directed control of the arbitral process by providing that action must be commenced at the 
Court of Appeal and providing strict deadlines for judges and parties to take action. However, given the 
new fast paced procedures, parties and tribunals must ensure that all procedural measures are properly 
taken over the course of the arbitration, especially prior to the rendering of awards by tribunals.  
During the coming period as more arbitral awards come before the UAE onshore courts for 
ratification and/or nullification, the business and legal community will gain insight as to the effectiveness 
of the Arbitration Law. The debate will undoubtedly continue as to choice of arbitration clause, forum, and 
legal seat. It may well be that the UAE legislators will decide that further clarifications are required in the 
future.  
 
  
 
105 Tessa Dignam, Show me the money! Enforcing arbitral awards in the UAE <http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/show-
me-the-money-enforcing-arbitral-awards-in-the-uae/> (accessed last 25 December 2018).  
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PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Special Protections under International Law: 
Implications of Diplomatic Immunity in the Khashoggi Case 
Hannah Jung106 
 
In October 2018, the Washington Post journalist and outspoken critic of the Saudi royal family, 
Jamal Khashoggi, entered the Saudi consulate in Turkey to retrieve documents for his planned 
marriage.107 What the security cameras caught of his appearance moments before entering the building 
was the last to be seen of him. As the disturbing details of his murder have unfolded in the following 
weeks and months, the international community has faced the shocking prospect of a state-sanctioned 
killing of a citizen who was knowledgeable and perhaps wary of a plot but who could not have possibly 
imagined what was to befall him in those minutes upon entering the premises. 
 
While there are many questions still waiting to be answered, there is one looming question that 
raises important legal considerations: how was this possible in the first place? The disconcerting fact 
behind the Khashoggi murder is not only that the Saudi leadership seems to have played a role in 
carrying it out, but that it was possible due to a historical privilege under international law – diplomatic 
immunity. The Khashoggi case thus provides an opportunity to look into this legal device and debate its 
merits and limitations. 
 
Purpose 
 
The concept of diplomatic immunity is a unique one. Dating back to ancient times, the practice 
of providing protection for foreign envoys was recognized as necessary for the maintenance of amicable 
relations among states and pursuance of mutual interests.108 With the end of World War I and World War 
II, and a surge in international institutions and diplomatic activities, diplomatic immunity was further 
refined and embodied in official treaties, specifically in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The privileges granted to diplomats 
and official national representatives include protection from prosecution by the receiving state and 
exemption from certain required obligations such as paying taxes.109  
 
These provisions therefore accommodate foreign envoys in an effort to ensure that they can 
perform their role without prejudice or imposed obstacles in the receiving state. Both the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations have a significant 
 
106 Hannah Jung is a JD candidate at Cornell Law School. She has a bachelors from Ewha Womens’ University in South Korea 
and a MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
107 The Washington Post expressed concerns over the safety of its contributor in an article shortly after he was deemed to be 
missing. Post Contributor and Prominent Saudi Critic Jamal Khashoggi Feared Missing in Turkey, Washington Post, October 
2, 2018, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/02/post-contributor-and-prominent-
saudi-critic-jamal-khashoggi-feared-missing-in-turkey/?utm_term=.0fdd7767005e (last visited on October 23, 2018). 
108 See B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 1-7 (2d ed. 1979) 
109 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 23, United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations. Available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf 
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number of state parties, 192 and 179 respectively, and including most if not all state parties from the 
Middle East.110 
 
Limitations 
 
The question as to whether diplomatic immunity ultimately made Khashoggi’s murder possible 
or at least easier to accomplish has no clear answer. On one hand, it is true that consulates cannot be 
searched or entered without permission from the sending country.111 While this was the main concern 
behind investigation efforts into the case, the Saudi consulate itself is not in fact considered to be Saudi 
territory. Being located on Turkish territory, Turkey holds jurisdiction over the case, at least in theory.112 
In practical terms, however, Turkish investigators could not demand inspection of the consulate or the 
Saudi suspects. The situation reflects the fragile balance of interests between sending and receiving states 
upon which diplomatic immunity and cooperative relations depend. Diplomatic immunity is effective due 
to mutual obligations that is expected of countries, and because treatment of diplomats is mutually 
enforced.  
 
The apparent possibility for abuse of diplomatic immunity is addressed in parts of the 
convention. Article 55 of the Convention on Consular Relations, for example, emphasizes the implied 
obligations of all persons who qualify for immunity to adhere to the laws of the country where they are 
placed, and it is expressly stated that the consulate should not be used to violate the sole purposes of the 
consulate.113 Notably, exceptions are made for annexes to the building that houses the consulate, in case 
these additional offices in the building are not for such consular functions.114 The murder of Khashoggi 
on the Saudi consular premises are therefore seen to have violated the terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of that 
article, while paragraph 3 is irrelevant. 
 
When a consular person acts in such a way that violates the provisions of the convention, the 
receiving state may also declare that person as persona non grata and wait for the sending state to take 
 
110 The following Arab states are members of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syria, United 
Arab Emirates, Yemen. (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen expressed reservations about Article 27 
concerning treatment of the diplomatic bag.) 
The following Arab states are members of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syria, United Arab Emirates, 
Yemen. 
See id.; see also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations. Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20596/volume-596-I-8638-English.pdf 
111 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22; see also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 31 
112 See 1 Oppenheim’s International Law 1077 n.15 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) 
113 Article 55 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations states “1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, 
it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. 
They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of the State. 2. The consular premises shall not be used in any 
manner incompatible with the exercise of consular functions. 3. The provisions of paragraph 2 of this article shall not exclude 
the possibility of offices of other institutions or agencies being installed in part of the building… provided that the premises 
assigned to them are separate from those used by the consular post…” 
114 See id. 
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the necessary responsive measures.115 For the Khashoggi case, there are two reasons why these 
provisions lack substance or applicability. First, the 15 suspects potentially involved in the incident are 
not embassy officials or diplomats as defined by and subject to either convention. “Members of the staff 
of the mission” or “members of the diplomatic staff” are defined as members having diplomatic rank,116 
and a “consular employee” is defined as “any person employed in the administrative or technical service” 
of a “consular post”,117 or “any consulate-general, consulate, vice-consulate or consular agency.”118 
While it is now evident that the Saudi state was to some extent culpable and may even be complicit in the 
crime, it is not clear in what capacity the perpetrators were acting and if they will ever be returned to 
Turkey for further investigation.  
 
Second, this uncertainty is largely a product of the language of the conventions and international 
treaties in general, in that countries cannot be forced to turn in suspects or evidence. Even the most 
strongly worded terms contain language that merely suggests how receiving states can act in response to 
violations of a provision, indicating that the state may notify the sending state of unacceptable officers 
and moreover that the sending state may recall or terminate the person’s functions with the assigned 
consular post.  
 
Such a lack of enforcement mechanism is characteristic of international instruments that find 
basis in voluntary cooperation and reluctance in forceful measures against a country’s sovereignty. There 
is no mention of sanctions for failure to cooperate, but this is much the norm. In sum, while Turkey may 
have the available option of terminating diplomatic immunity of the Saudi individuals or even shutting 
down the consulate with no consideration for Saudi consent, there is simply no incentive to for any 
country to take such drastic measures at the risk of losing diplomatic opportunities. 
 
Future implications 
 
What does the Khashoggi case present for the future of diplomatic immunity? One possible 
“solution” to the lack of sanctions and enforcement measures in the conventions is supplementation with 
more concise provisions or setting clearer grounds for waiver of immunity. According to Article 40 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatise (1969), treaty provisions may undergo amendment but must 
either meet specific requirements for adoption or attain unanimous support.119 However, amending 
international treaties, especially in dealing with sensitive notions of respect for state sovereignty or 
punitive actions, is extremely unlikely to be backed by such support, even in light of dramatic and 
disturbing incidents such as the Khashoggi case. 
 
Other suggested methods to prevent abuse of diplomatic immunity include isolating nations 
which abuse the Vienna Convention provisions, creating a fund to compensate victims of foreign 
diplomats, requiring prosecution of the diplomat in the sending state, and a more restrictive interpretation 
 
115 Article 23 states “1. The receiving State may at any time notify the sending State that a consular officer is persona non grata 
or that any other member of the consular staff is not acceptable. In that event, the sending State shall, as the case may be, 
either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the consular post.” Id. 
116 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 1 
117 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 1 
118 See id. 
119 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 40, United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations. Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%2000-52%20AM/Ch_XXIII_01.pdf 
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of the provisions.120 However, any of these potential solutions seem infeasible because they face practical 
challenges either in terms of expenses or a high level of international cooperation that is unlikely to be 
achieved. 
 
Ironically, that reality is closely related to the need for diplomatic immunity and the strong desire 
to uphold a system which would be most effective with unquestionable recognition of these special 
privileges. The long-term implications of terminating diplomatic immunity are damaging to the system as 
a whole, as it creates a doorway for other countries to follow suit when it is in their advantage to do so. 
Ultimately, the way international mechanisms work depends largely on genuine trust and good will of 
countries, which may have to be sustained at times at the cost of incidental abuse and as Khashoggi’s 
death demonstrated, unfortunate sacrifice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The horrific murder of Khashoggi at the hands of the Saudis in the Saudi consulate on foreign 
land is an example of how compromise between the implementation of a necessary and widely followed 
practice and clarity can result in human rights abuse without adequate means for redress. The case 
provides an opportunity for closer observation of the privileges that are granted to diplomats and 
important questions regarding the need for clarification in preventing abuse of such privilege.  
 
At the same time, it presents a challenge which is not easily overcome in a system where 
protections and the smooth functioning of consular functions is intricately and delicately tied to 
expectations of good faith. It is unlikely that countries will willingly restrict diplomatic immunity to 
prevent another similar incident that might or might not happen in the future. Only time will tell whether 
violations for political motivations will be grave enough to require more stringent and binding standards 
in order to prevent protections under diplomatic immunity from being used as a tool for injustice. 
 
  
 
120 See Leslie Shirin Farhangi, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1517, 1522 (1986) 
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CORRUPTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS A LONG-LASTING EFFECT OF THE U.S. PRIMARY AND 
SECONDARY BOYCOTTS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
SEYED MOHSEN ROWHANI121 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 28, 2015, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared, “a new chapter has started in 
Iran’s relations with the world.”122 This development emerged from the conclusion of over a year of 
intensive negotiating efforts concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program with the P5+1, 
which resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”).123 Within the United States, the 
terms and details of the JCPOA have been controversial.124  
For the Obama Administration, which purportedly sought to halt Iran’s nuclear program in a way 
that would avoid another US war in the Middle East, the JCPOA was envisioned as bringing 
“extraordinary benefits to US national security and the peace and security of the world.”125 Vis-à-vis the 
traditional US ally, Israel, the JCPOA consisted of a “very bad deal,” representing a victory for “death, 
tyranny and the pursuit of Jihad.”126 On May 8, 2018, President Trump reminded the US of its 
commitment to its allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Israel127, and declared that the US would 
no longer engage in the JCPOA128 and that all U.S. secondary boycotts would be re-imposed in a highest 
“wind-down period” of 180 days.129 Once that period expired on November 5, 2018, all U.S. sanctions, 
 
121 J.S.D. Candidate, International Trade Law, Cardozo Law School; LL.M., International Law and Justice, 2018, Fordham 
Law School. 
122 President Hassan Rouhani, Statement by the President at the General Debate of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (Sept. 28, 2015), available at http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_Iran_en.pdf (last visited on 
February 21, 2019). 
123 The P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council––the United States, Russia, China, 
Great Britain, and France––as well as Germany. In European parlance, the P5+1 is alternatively called the EU+3. See Joshua 
Keating, You Say P5+1, I Say E3+3, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 30, 2009), available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/30/you-say-p51-i-say-e33/(last visited on February 21, 2019). 
124 Daniel R. DePetris, A Frustrating Iran Deal for Republicans, THE HILL (Sept. 24, 2015), available at 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/254756-a-frustrating-iran-deal-for-republications (last visited, Feb. 21, 
2019). 
125 President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Adaption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at 
American University (Oct. 18, 2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/18/statement-
president-adoption-joint-comprehensive-plan-action (last visited on February 21, 2019). 
126 Christopher Beall, The Emerging Investment Landscape of Post-Sanctions Iran: Opportunities, Risks, and Implications on 
US Foreign Policy, 39 Fordham Int'l L.J. 839 (2016)). 
127 President Donald Trump, Statement by the President on Standing with Saudi Arabia at the White House (Nov. 20, 2018), 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-standing-saudi-arabia/ (last 
visited, Feb. 21, 2019). 
128 President Donald Trump, US Will No Longer Abide By Iran Deal – As It Happened, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2018), 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/may/08/iran-nuclear-deal-donald-trump-latest-live-updates (last 
visited, Feb. 21, 2019). 
129 Exec. Order No. 13846, 83 C.F.R. 38939 (Aug. 6, 2018), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/08/07/2018-17068/reimposing-certain-sanctions-with-respect-to-iran 
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including those on energy or banking transactions with Iran, went back into force.130 In response, 
President Hassan Rouhani said: “If we achieve the deal's goals in cooperation with other members131 of 
the deal, it will remain in place.”132  
To persuade the Iranian leadership to abide by the JCPOA, Europe has a three-prong action plan 
that consists of guaranteeing European Investment Bank (EIB) services to Iran. Activating the “blocking 
statute”133 to safeguard European firms dealing with Iran against U.S. secondary boycotts that authorize 
the imposition of sanctions against non-U.S. persons for doing business with Iran.134 Additionally, 
blocking statues help secure direct credit transfers to Iran’s Central Bank by bypassing the U.S. financial 
system.135 
The gradual demise of the nuclear deal appears more and more likely if Europe, Russia, and 
China fail to neutralize the crippling U.S. sanctions against Iran. While it might not lead directly to war, 
this scenario would substantially escalate regional tensions and further destabilize the Middle East.136   
After forty years of scrimmaging with economic sanctions, the Iranian government has 
established some measures to circumvent them, but they are reluctant to discuss these measures openly so 
as not to compromise them. The majority of these measures are unofficial, and the most likely 
consequence of an unofficial action is a lack of accountability and predictable corruption. Examples 
include currency swaps with other countries and even cryptocurrency trading.137 It should be noted that 
Iran borders seven states by land: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, 
and Iraq, Iran also shares maritime borders with Russia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and 
Oman. Therefore, as eight of these countries are Middle Eastern Countries, we are discussing a disaster in 
the Middle East.138 
SANCTIONS, CORRUPTION, AND THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
130 Maysam Behravesh, As US Sanctions Loom, Can Iran Nuclear Deal Still be Saved, REUTERS, (Jul. 23, 2018), available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-behravesh-iran-commentary/commentary-as-u-s-sanctions-loom-can-iran-nuclear-deal-
still-be-saved-idUSKBN1KD2C5 (last visited, Feb. 21, 2019). 
131 All members except the US, supra, note 3. 
132 Hassan Rouhani, Iran to Negotiate with World Powers to Keep Nuclear Deal in Place, AL JAZEERA (May 8, 2018), 
available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/iran-negotiate-world-powers-nuclear-deal-place-
180508190536432.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
133 A blocking statute is a law of one jurisdiction intended to hinder the application of a law of a foreign jurisdiction. A 
blocking statute was proposed by the European Union in 1996 to nullify a US trade embargo on Cuba and sanctions related to 
Iran and Libya which affected countries that were trading with the US and with the named countries. See Blocking 
statute, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Blocking_statute&oldid=879549456 (last visited Feb. 23, 2019). 
134 W. Clark McFadden II & Henry Clark  (Orrick, Herrington & Suttcliffe), United States Extends and Tightens Iran 
Sanctions, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 13, 2012), available at  
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5cfbc81d-eae3-4aad-b00d-45572783597c (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
135 Supra, note 10. 
136 Id. 
137 Ted Regencia, How Can Iran Bypass US Sanctions, AL JAZEERA (Now. 5, 2018), available at  
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/iran-bypass-sanctions-181105052751998.html (last visited, Feb. 21, 2019). 
138 Geography of Iran, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Geography_of_Iran&oldid=883402470 (last visited Feb. 21, 
2019). 
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One of the significant consequences of sanctions is potential violations of human rights. Crippling 
sanctions139 may deprive people of some of their basic human rights, including the right to work, the right 
to an adequate standard of living, the right to social security and for those who are denied access to 
foreign medical treatment and medicine, the right to life. Additionally, and to that effect, the inflation 
caused by the sanctions make it exponentially more difficult for patients to afford necessary medical 
treatment.140 Furthermore, sanctions have an immediate, definite and long-lasting effect on the trade, 
banking and financial sectors of a country by expanding and deepening corruption and money-laundering 
schemes. 
Although sanctions are sometimes seen as a non-violent way of achieving a political or economic 
goal, to some, they may not bring about the outcome desired. The history of sanctions against Cuba 
which lasted for more than five decades achieved none of Washington’s policy objectives.141 The 
sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 during the crisis over Ukraine have contributed to a surge in Putin’s 
popularity and the growth of Russian patriotism and nationalism.142 And a government like Syria that is 
fighting for preservation will always have bigger problems than sanctions guiding its choices.143 
Sanctions may not achieve the goals of its imposer but, will decrease the ability of the target 
government to fight against corruption and money-laundering, and even worse, forcing the government to 
raise or help the individuals to bypass the boycotts will unavoidably lead to public corruption. For 
instance, in a state like Russia, sanctions have likely contributed to the many problems for which it was 
previously criticized.144 It is predictable that there is no significant difference between long-term and 
short-term sanctions regarding generating corruption in sanctioned countries. Using a sample of 73 
sanctioned and 60 non-sanctioned countries, as well as corruption data spanning the years 1995 to 2012, 
suggests that countries that have undergone economic sanctions appear to be more corrupt than non-
sanctioned countries. Also, the study shows that comprehensive economic sanctions tend to generate 
more corruption than partial sanctions. Even though there was a reasonable expectation that countries 
undergoing longer-term economic coercion would be more likely to craft illegal tools to evade sanctions, 
resulting in greater corruption, the findings did not verify that assumption.145 
UN CONCERNS BY SANCTIONED COUNTRIES’ CORRUPTIONS 
 
139 Gregg Re, John Bolton warns Iran “there will be hell to pay” if aggression continues: “We will come after you,” FOX 
NEWS, (Sep. 25, 2018), available at https://www.foxnews.com/politics/john-bolton-warns-iran-there-will-be-hell-to-pay-if-
aggression-continues-we-will-come-after-you (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
140 Nilo Tabrizi, Iranian Fear Medicine Shortage as U.S. Tightens Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/11/world/middleeast/iran-sanctions.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
141 Doug Bandow, End U.S. Embargo After Fidel Castro’s death: Continued Sanctions Won’t free Cuba, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2016), 
available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2016/11/30/end-u-s-embargo-after-fidel-castros-death-continued-sanctions-wont-
free-cuba/#170f9cca32fe (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
142 Dmitri Trenin, How effective are economic sanctions?, WEFORUM (Feb. 26, 2015), available at 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/02/how-effective-are-economic-sanctions/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
143 Ian Bremmer, How U.S. Sanctions Are Working (or Not) in 5 Countries, TIME (Jul. 31, 2017), available at 
http://time.com/4875370/sanctions-russia-north-korea-iran-donald-trump/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
144 Bryan R. Early, Economic Sanctions Aren’t Just Ineffective -They Lead to Corruption and Organized Crime, QUARTZ (May 1, 2015), 
available at  https://qz.com/394607/economic-sanctions-arent-just-ineffective-they-lead-to-corruption-and-organized-crime/ (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2019). 
145 Kamali, T., Mashayekh, M., & Jandaghi, G., The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Corruption in Target Countries: A 
Cross Country Study, WORLD SCIENTIFIC NEWS, 276-291 (2016), available at http://www.worldscientificnews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/WSN-452-2016-276-291.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
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The latest findings from Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer Series shows 
that in the Middle East and North Africa, on average, elected representatives, tax officials and 
government officials were thought to be highly corrupt by 45 percent of the population.146 The forms of 
this kind of political corruption include bribery, cronyism, extortion, nepotism, parochialism, patronage, 
influence peddling, and embezzlement.147 A general lack of accountability will enable criminal enterprise 
such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking to move easier within a sanctioned 
country and its border countries. 
Therefore, it’s no wonder that measuring corruption is at the heart of the United Nations 
sustainable development goals. United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly expressed 
apprehensions about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and 
security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and 
jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law.148Additionally, no one can doubt that the 
consequences of corruption adversely affect all human rights; civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural.149  Furthermore, the World Summit on Sustainable Development has declared public corruption 
“a threat to the sustainable development of people”.150  
Kofi Annan described corruption as an “insidious plague” with many corrosive effects on 
societies: “It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts 
markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crimes, terrorism and other threats to human 
security to flourish.”151 He rightly believed that corruption typically diverts funds from state budgets that 
should be dedicated to the advancement of human rights. It therefore, undermines a state’s human rights 
obligation to maximize available resources for the progressive realization of rights recognized in Article 
2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Corruption is one of the 
elements in economic underperformance and a pivotal hurdle to development and poverty alleviation. It 
diminishes the government’s ability to plan and deliver services, including health, education, and welfare, 
all of which are indispensable to the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights. Civil and political 
rights are also negatively affected. Corruption diminishes public support for democratic institutions and 
discourages people from demanding respect for their civil and political rights and from exercising such 
rights.152 
 
146 50 Million People in the Middle East and North Africa Paid Bribes Last Year, for more details see 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/50_million_people_in_the_middle_east_and_north_africa_paid_bribes_last_year 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
147 Walter Sandosam, who’s to blame for the cesspool of corruption? THE STAR (Oct. 9, 2018), available at 
https://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/letters/2018/10/09/whos-to-blame-for-the-cesspool-of-corruption/ (last visited  Feb. 21, 
2019). 
148 UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 31 October 2003, A/58/422, available at 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4374b9524.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
149 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), The Human Rights Case Against Corruption, (Mar. 27, 
2013), available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/HRCaseAgainstCorruption.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
150 Johannesburg Declaration, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Johannesburg_Declaration&oldid=882582332 (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
151 Kofi Annan, Statement on the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, (Oct. 31, 2003), available at 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/secretary-general-speech.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
152 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), Article 14(1)(a), available at 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf 
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It is worth noting that many developing countries have repeatedly expressed their concerns over 
the disastrous consequences that economic sanctions may have on the ability of the sanctioned country to 
prevent and combat corruption and transnational organized crimes. On several occasions, the Group of 77 
and China153 called upon all UN member states as well as other relevant regional and international 
organizations to avoid unilateral actions and sanctions that might weaken the international cooperation 
framework and member’s ability to police financial crimes.154 
SANCTIONS FACILITATE CORRUPTION AND MONEY-LAUNDERING 
As mentioned above, corruption destabilizes the political order in any society and decreases 
people’s enjoyment of civil and political rights. Links between corruption and other forms of crimes, in 
particular, organized crimes and economic crimes, including money-laundering, are evident and 
indisputable. The parties to UNCAC, a total of 186 states155 have agreed that “corruption is no longer a 
local matter but a transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making 
international cooperation to prevent and control it, is essential.”156 Under UNCAC, states are obligated to 
prevent and combat corruption and money-laundering within their territory. However, as elaborated in 
UNCAC, corruption is not a local matter and, therefore, the obligation to prevent and combat corruption 
and money-laundering is not limited to a countries’ borders. In addition to a nation’s territorial 
obligations, under chapter IV of UNCAC, state parties are obliged to assist one another in every aspect of 
the fight against corruption, including prevention, investigation, and the prosecution of offenders. 
Cooperation takes the form of extradition, mutual legal assistance, and law enforcement cooperation.  
Economic sanctions can directly and negatively impact a country’s overall economy, ultimately 
increasing poverty, inflation, unemployment. But economic sanctions also have indirect, long-term 
consequences that may be less visible. The unobserved repercussions of economic sanctions include 
weakening or destroying the abilities of relevant authorities in the sanctioned country to supervise, 
monitor and control monetary transactions and financial processes. Certain conditions promote 
corruption and financial crimes more than others, and insufficient transparency and oversight are the 
chiefs among them.  
In this regard, Article XIV of UNCAC requires each state party to institute a comprehensive 
regulatory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions, including natural or legal persons that 
provide formal or informal services for the transactions of money or value within its competence.157 To 
that end, such regulatory and supervisory regimes shall ensure that the authorities dedicated to policing 
money-laundering can cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels.  
 
153 The Group of 77 (G77) at the United Nations is a coalition of 134 developing nations, designed to promote its members' 
collective economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations. See generally 
http://www.g77.org/doc/index.html#aim (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
154 Evandro De Sampaio Didonet, Statement of the G-77 and China during the 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice delivered by the permanent representative of Brazil, Qatar, (Apr. 12-19, 2015) 
http://www.g77.org/vienna/13thUNCC.htm. 
155 Supra,  note 32. 
156 Preamble, supra note 32, p.5, available at 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf 
157 Article 14(1), supra note 32. 
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UNCAC requires state parties to implement feasible measures to detect and monitor the 
movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, subject to safeguards to 
ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the flow of authorized capital.158 
Additionally, states are required to implement appropriate and feasible measures to require financial 
institutions, including money remittance bodies to indicate accurate and meaningful information on the 
originator of the money in electronic transfer forms. UNCAC also requires states to maintain such 
information throughout the payment chain; and to apply enhanced scrutiny to transfers of funds that do 
not contain complete information on the originator.”159  
These provisions can be impossible tasks for a country is under economic sanctions. In a boycott 
situation, where all transboundary transfers are done through hidden channels, these provisions will be 
useless. When normal channels of money transferring are blocked, all the legitimate and reasonable needs 
must inevitably be addressed through alternative channels. This phenomenon is called sanction 
circumvention, and these alternative channels, by definition, are meticulously tailored to be covert and 
difficult to trace, lest they fall into the net of sanctions. In such situation, methods like money transferring 
through currency exchange offices instead of banks or in cash, and other ways of payment and value 
transfer which leave no trace and record in relevant authorities gradually become the norm. 
Efforts to evade sanctions usually include registering multiple companies and creating a 
sophisticated network of proxy companies to make it difficult for regulators to exercise their job of 
detecting transactions that attempt to circumvent sanctions. Simultaneously, they make it difficult for 
internal and national authorities of the sanctioned country to regulate, monitor and supervise the trends 
and transactions. Inspection and auditing such multi-layered networks of financial companies can be 
close to impossible. These are the ideal conditions for corruption and money-laundering.  
In a situation in which the abnormal becomes normal, the irregular becomes regular, what was 
once transparency transforms to obscurity. In sanctioned countries, this defective financial cycle is 
recognized as the primary way to evade sanctions and meet the legitimate needs of citizens. No room 
remains for monitoring and transparency. When such behavior gradually crystallizes into stable norms 
and reaches epidemic proportions, it will be an extremely challenging task to restore things to normal, 
even after the sanctions are lifted and the channels are opened. A corrupt and non-transparent economic 
structure will resist all efforts aimed at preventing and combating financial crimes. 160  
CORRUPTION IN IRAN: RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS  
The United States fully re-imposed the sanctions161 on Iran that had been lifted or waived under 
the JCPOA. The sanctions have targeted critical sectors of Iran’s economy, including energy, trade, 
shipbuilding, and finance.162 Additionally, it has banned purchases of U.S. dollars by Iran and prevented 
the trade of gold, metals, and automobiles. Its mere prospect has fueled a record crash in the value of the 
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Iranian Rial (down seventy percent since May 2018).163 The government’s attempts to stabilize the 
currency by pegging it at a set rate to the dollar backfired and ended up accelerating its decline.  
Over the past few months, record temperatures, power outages, and water shortages, along with a 
fifty percent rise in the price of some food items, have triggered scattered protests. Iran’s economic crisis 
has left ordinary citizens enduring soaring living costs, but prosecutors allege that wayward entrepreneurs 
have turned it into a moneymaking opportunity.164 In one case, the name of a dead person was used to 
import 10,500 mobile phones using foreign currency issued at Iran’s favorable official rate.165 In another 
case, an unskilled worker thought to be someone else’s proxy, managed to buy 38,000 gold coins from 
the Iranian Central Bank at below-market rates.166  
Many of the failing institutions sank their money into speculative investments during a real estate 
bubble, lent money to well-connected friends or charged usurious interest rates to desperate borrowers. 
Now, regulators have quietly steered many of the companies into mergers with larger banks to try to 
absorb their losses, but that has created a worsening problem of bad loans and overvalued assets 
throughout the banking system.167 Following this financial crisis, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah 
Khamenei declared, “I have acknowledged responsibility for the growing number of victims of corrupt 
financial institutions. These appeals must be dealt with and heard out. I am responsible; all of us must 
follow this approach.”168 
IRAN’S MEASURES TO CIRCUMVENT THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS  
The Supreme Council of Economic Coordination, chaired by President Hassan Rouhani, 
authorized the Central Bank of Iran to facilitate the trade of foreign currencies in the Secondary Market, 
where Iranian petrochemicals, steel, and other exporters authorized to sell their earned dollars to 
importers at negotiable price, not at the price set by the Central Bank. It also allowed the Central Bank to 
conduct an open market operation. It will encourage foreign investment and attract foreign currency 
resources, like dual-nationals’ capital, by the methods mentioned below. 
In late October 2018, the council announced that offering oil for sale will be possible via the stock 
exchange. Just minutes after the opening bell as much as 280,000 barrels and at the end of the first day of 
trading, a total of one million barrels of crude oil were sold. In turn, the buyers can sell this small 
amount––as opposed to governmental oil cargos––of the crude oil to the world market with less 
traceability. The inevitable consequence of the sale of oil by this way is exporting to the countries 
 
163 Ladan Naseri, Golnar Motevalli, Arsalan Shahla, After Sanctions, Iran’s Economy Is Nearing a Crisis, BBG (Aug. 9, 
2018), available at 
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visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
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http://www.bbc.com/persian/blog-viewpoints-45307079 (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
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bordering Iran. It means they have the 6000 km169 (almost two times bigger than Mexico and The U.S. 
borderline) to sell their legitimate oil that is an obvious measure for circumventing the US Sanctions. The 
payment method of these types of deals is in cash to decrease the traceability.170 The danger of corruption 
in the Middle East becomes clear. 
Additionally, the Cabinet of Iran, chaired by President Hassan Rouhani, has enacted a new 
resolution to authorize currency exchange offices to commence importing foreign bills in cash.171 The 
goal is to stop the inflation of the Iranian Rial. The pertinent part of that resolution states:  
“The entry of foreign currency into banknotes and gold to the country, in regard to the rules for 
combating money-laundering, is permitted without any restriction. Gold imported is immune to 
any taxes, legal fees and value-added tax following the provisions of the Central Bank of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.”172 This resolution makes Iran the most attractive country in the region 
for money-laundering by a foreigner and Iranian citizens who want to own gold and foreign 
currency without paying taxes. The council also declared that foreign nationals who invest 
$250,000 in Iran could obtain a five-year residency permit.173 
Furthermore, Iran's partners, namely Russia and China, would not be willing to talk about the 
alternatives, such as making a new deal with the United States regarding Iran’s nuclear activities. Russia, 
which has not been included in the US waiver,174 has denounced the sanctions, declaring them "illegal". 
There have been indications that Moscow would help Tehran bypass the sanctions by buying Iranian oil, 
then reselling it in refined form to Europe.175   
Moreover, in August 2018, the European Union updated its Blocking Statute thereby shielding 
European companies from the U.S. sanctions while allowing them to continue operating in Iran and 
allowing them to recover damages arising from punitive sanctions. The law also will enable EU persons 
to avoid complying with the sanctions by protecting them from US penalties which cannot be applied 
unless exceptionally authorized by the European Commission. While it could work for small businesses 
with no links to the US, the statute could have limited use in Iran, particularly among major European 
companies with global operations. Those companies are automatically exposed to possible US penalties 
in the event they do deal with Iran.176 
 
169 Supra note 18. 
170 Arman Aramesh, Offering Oil for Sale Via Stock Exchange; Can the Private Sector Circumvent the US Sanction? BBC 
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CONCLUSION 
Under ordinary circumstances, if a government has the will to fight corruption and money-
laundering, it is essential to adopt measures aimed at maximizing transparency and monitoring all 
transfers of money and value. Sanctions only make these goals impossible. Sanctions cause corruption 
and destroy transparency and control over funds and value transfers. This constitutes a breach of the 
international obligations of the sanctioning states under UNCAC and a violation of international human 
rights law.  
In the case of Iran, the new U.S. administration’s policy of imposing sanctions would face more 
complexities now compared with the time of the last administration. President Donald Trump wants to 
force Iran’s leaders to negotiate a new deal. On the other hand, Ayatollah Khamenei emphasizes the 
benefits of the sanctions in making the Iranian people and government independent.177 Additionally, 
Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif, started a new path to expand the relations with European 
countries, thereby exerting pressure on the US to save the Nuclear Deal.  
In the meantime, people are suffering due to lack of access to food and medicine from abroad, and 
the corruption caused by money-laundering, the illegitimate sell of oil, and untraceable transactions will 
likely linger on in the Middle East for decades to come.If the US does not establish an influential group 
of supporters for its policy, the sanctions will fail. This would serve as an opportunity for the European 
countries, with support from Russia and China, to erect legitimate means of circumventing future US 
sanctions. The consequence would be a weakening of the structure of economic sanctions and their 
diminished effectiveness as political tools. It is not surprising that on February 16, 2019, the US 
Democratic National Committee adopted a motion solidifying the party’s position that the US should 
rejoin the JCPOA: a sign that this is gearing up to be a corner stone issue of the upcoming 2020 US 
presidential elections.178  
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HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Religious Persecution and the Destabilization of Algeria:  
The Case of Ahmadi Muslims 
Farrah Qazi179 
On December 11, 2018, the Court of First Instance in Ain Mila, Algeria, sentenced Karim 
Hadjaze, a thirty seven year old doctor and member of the minority Muslim sect, Ahmadiyyat, to one 
year in prison and 20,000 dinar fine (US$175), on charges of collecting donations without a license and 
conducting worship in unauthorized places. In the same case, ten other co-defendants received sentences 
ranging from three to six months in prison.180 
In January, 2019, eight more Defendants faced expedited trials on charges ranging from 
unauthorized practice of religion, worship in public places and other crimes prescribed in Article 144 of 
Algeria’s Penal Code.181 Human Rights Watch has reported that in December, 2017, alone, there were at 
least eight new trials in Algeria involving at least fifty Ahmadi defendants. Since June, 2016, more than 
265 Ahmadi Muslims have faced criminal charges, some of them in more than one trial.182 This is 
significant because Article 144 of the penal code, Articles 1 and 8 which regulate obtaining donations 
without a license, Article 46 of the Associations Law which punishes those who worship in unauthorized 
places, and a myriad of other laws, allows for Ahmadi Muslims to face separate trials on multiple 
charges. 
Who are Ahmadi Muslims and why are they being so unjustly targeted?  
The Ahmadiyyat Movement of Islam was founded in India in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. It is a 
revivalist movement that strives to adhere to the original teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and 
believes Ahmad is its Messiah. Ahmadi Muslims consider themselves to be Muslims and behave and 
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Prophet Mohammed or denigrates the creed or prophets of Islam through writing, drawing, declaration, or any other means, 
will receive three to five years in prison, and/or be subject to a fine of between 50,000 and 100,000 Algerian dinars (between 
about US$450 and US$900). In addition, although Algeria permits religious organizations to participate in humanitarian work, 
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believe as other Muslims do. However, they are widely regarded as heretical and are persecuted across 
the Middle East as such.183 It is estimated that there are 2,000 Ahmadi Muslims in Algeria.184 
The alarming rate of Ahmadi Muslim persecution in Algeria is troubling for several reasons. First, 
it underscores a growing rise of religious fundamentalism in a nation that is strategically positioned to 
help the West combat global terrorism. As a matter of fact, since the events of September 11, 2001, 
Algeria and the U.S. have entered into an uncomfortable alliance. While Algeria was the first Middle 
Eastern country to condemn the heinous acts of September 11, and has since worked with the United 
States counter-terrorism efforts, tensions have arisen because it will not allow US to operate unmanned 
aerial vehicles in its airspace.185 The suspicion and mistrust that tempers an uneasy alliance with the 
West, coupled with Algeria’s strategic, geographic position and increasing religious fundamentalism 
could result in serious breaches in global security.  
It is important to note that when a government persecutes its minorities; this often becomes a 
stepping stone for increased instability and terrorism within that region. Therefore, the seemingly 
disconnected arrests and trials of Ahmadi Muslims can have significant backlash to any efforts to 
eradicate terrorism from the Middle East.  
Second, Algeria’s treatment of minorities defies numerous international laws, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which Algeria has signed and ratified. Among other things, the Covenant requires that 
governments ensure the right to freedom of religion to everyone.  However, the Algerian Constitution 
guarantees freedom of religion with a caveat; it states: “This freedom must be exercised in respect of the 
law.”186  
Herein lies the problem: while the Constitution purports to provide freedom of religion for all 
persons, it also explicitly declares Islam to be its state religion.187 Additionally, the Constitution prohibits 
institutions from behaving in any manner that does not comport with Islamic morality. But who is 
supposed to judge Islamic morality and who will enforce it? 
As discussed, Algeria’s Constitution does not fully guarantee freedom of religion and has specific 
rules of worship for non-Muslims. Algeria’s government also declares any religious minority practice to 
be a criminal offence and bans conversion and blasphemy.188  Such blasphemy laws make proselytizing 
and public expression of the Ahmadi Muslim beliefs, as well as Christian/Jewish faiths, dangerous. Even 
casual conversations between friends and family members regarding faith can be grounds for blasphemy 
 
183What is Ahmadiyyat?, available at https://www.alislam.org/library/book/what-is-ahmadiyyat/ (last visited February 26, 
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charges.189 This leaves the regulation of religious practice to local Islamic clerics and provincial 
government bodies.   
Other laws and regulations provide Muslims and non-Muslims the freedom to practice their 
religion as long as they respect public order, morality, and the rights and basic freedoms of others.190  
Again, it is not clear what constitutes public order or morality. Such breaches of various laws are 
punished with one to three years of imprisonment, and fines between 100,000 to 300,000 Algerian dinars 
(about 900 to 2,700 US dollars). 191 
Religious intolerance and hostility has spread to such a point that minorities have become wary of 
their neighbors. As a result, Algerian Jews, Christians and Ahmadi Muslims have tried to keep a low 
profile. Violent extremists have also used these laws as a means to justify the killing of religious 
minorities.192 
According to Open Doors, an advocacy group that aims to raise awareness of Christian 
persecution throughout the world, Christians in Algeria are facing increasing societal discrimination 
when it comes to renting homes, finding jobs and securing land or property to use as a place of 
worship.193 In fact, Christian churches have been ordered to stop all religious activities. In July 2016, 
Slimane Bouhafs, a Christian, was arrested for insulting Islam and received the maximum sentence of 
five years. It was only after increased foreign pressure, that the president issued a pardon and Bouhafs 
served 18 months instead.194  
Therefore, while the Algerian Constitution provides religious freedom for all on its face, the 
reality reflects much to the contrary. There is no attempt by the government to curb protect the religious 
practice or expression of minorities. Similarly, Algeria’s own political leaders have little regard for 
political correctness. In 2016, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Mohamed Aissa, declared that the 
government had brought criminal charges against Ahmadis to “stop deviation from religious precepts”.195  
Meanwhile, Ahmed Ouyahia, then Chief of Cabinet to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, claimed that 
Ahmadis enjoyed neither human rights nor freedom of religion because Algeria had been a “Muslim 
country for 14 centuries.”196 
When a state fails to protect its religious minorities, it equates to the passive acceptance of their 
persecution; it tacitly encourages and inevitably emboldens religious fundamentalism and extremism. 
Furthermore, it will come as no surprise that nations that encourage religious or ideological extremism 
are inclined to political instability of the most infectious kind.  Therefore, it is prudent that we recognize 
the problem and make valiant attempts to curb its potentially widespread consequences. 
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The Arab Human Rights System: Achievements and Challenges 
Armis Sadri197 
I. Introduction 
 
It comes as no surprise that people in the Arab world and beyond largely view the Arab League, 
formally the League of Arab States (LAS), as a futile and ineffective organization serving the interest of 
governments than addressing human rights concerns.198 LAS is a regional organization of Arab states in 
and around North Africa, the Horn of Africa and Arabia.199 It was formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945, 
and according to its charter200, the founding members of the Arab League (Egypt, Syria, 
Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen) agreed to seek "close cooperation" on 
matters of economics, communication, culture, nationality, social welfare, and health.201  
 
Currently, the League has 22 members, but Syria's participation has been suspended since 
November 2011, as a consequence of government’s repression during the Syrian Civil War.202 The 
League's main goal is to “draw closer the relations between the Member States and co-ordinate 
collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a 
general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.”203 Since its creation in 1945, the LAS has 
made little effort to discuss the dire human rights situation in the Arab world, one of the triggers of the 
Arab uprising, much less improve it.204 
  
LAS’ impotence is partly due to the absence of meaningful direct links between the LAS, victims 
of human rights violations and civil society organizations.205 Unlike similar organizations, the LAS 
grants civil society organizations observer status only and even then, only a few organizations are 
allowed this access on the basis of very restrictive criteria.206 The LAS has the potential to play a larger 
role in the protection of human rights. This is why, over the last 20 years, human rights, humanitarian and 
development organizations have engaged with various bodies of LAS. Although such efforts resulted 
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mostly in limited success, some had an impact.207 Understating the LAS, and its standards and 
mechanisms are essential for civil society organizations to identify future opportunities to influence it. 
This requires a coherent and strategic approach. The change may be slow, but persistence and informed 
vision will enable the civil society organizations and Member States to contribute to the reform of the 
LAS and push it to be driving force for the protection and promotion of human rights in the Arab 
world.208 This is a study about the efforts taken by the LAS to improve the protection of human rights 
among its Member States. 
  
This article identifies the major regional human rights protection systems, i.e. the African, the 
Inter-American and the European human rights systems as potential and established models to be 
considered by the LAS in moving forward with the creation of the Arab human rights system. The article 
examines the achievements and flaws of the current system and makes recommendations about effective 
change in the modality of LAS’s relationship with civil society organizations by setting forth 
mechanisms and unambiguous criteria based on transparency to ensure a permanent relationship across 
all its bodies. 
 
III.  A Brief History  
    
Compared to a global trend towards promoting and protecting human rights by regional 
organizations, the LAS209 is a latecomer in prescribing and promoting governance standards in its 
Member States, and its efforts are more limited and weaker than in many other regional organizations.210 
The LAS focuses on human rights as compared to democracy, the rule of law, or good governance. 
However, the latest catalog of human rights that was adopted in 2004 falls short of international 
standards.211 The revised Arab Charter on Humans Rights, as the cornerstone of a regional human rights 
regime, ratified and entered into force in 2008,212 much later than its American, European, and African 
counterparts. 
  
From the creation of the Arab Permanent Committee on Human Rights (PACHR) in 1968213 to 
the adoption of the revised Arab Charter on Human Rights in 2004214 and its subsequent ratification, 
there has not been a significant change in the democratic quality215 of its Member States that could 
account for the LAS’ increasing efforts in promoting and protecting human rights. Measuring the quality 
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of democracy requires making sure, in terms of institutional characteristics, a country is sufficiently 
democratic, and at a minimum, has universal suffrage and an uninterrupted democracy for a minimum 
number of years. To an important extent, higher democratic quality can be attributed to institutional 
characteristics of consensus democracy, especially proportional representation.216 
 
A. Inter-American Human Rights System 
 
The Inter-American system for the promotion and protection of human rights was formed after 
World War II through the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 
1948.217 The system lies on four main pillars: (1) human rights treaties, including the American 
Convention on Human Rights; (2) institutions, namely the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, independent entities from both states and NGOs, 
established respectively in 1959 and 1979;218 (3) states, the creators of the system and who bear the 
responsibility of complying with the decisions of the Commission and the Court; and (4) civil society, 
which provides the engine behind the functioning of the system, as advancement in the protection of 
human rights only occurs when civil society exerts pressure.219  
Notably, when the Inter-American human rights system was established most of the states in the 
region were dictatorships. Civil society organizations, having to defend themselves in hard times, played 
a major role in pushing for an independent system to protect human rights.220 The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is mandated to grant protective measures, a very critical and 
important aspect of its role in defending human rights.221 Previous Commission decisions have proved 
protective measures are effective, when granted. However, the States party to the regional system have 
harshly criticized protective measures, especially targeting the DC-based IACHR, which produced what 
was euphemistically called the “Process of Strengthening of the Inter-American System for the Protection 
of Human Rights.”222 Challenges remain despite the IACHR issuing a document on March 2013 
addressing these topics and amending its rules of procedure to conform with the results of the process.223  
 
216
 Id.  
217 Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 4, 2009, pp. 856–887., doi:10.1353/hrq.0.0108, History and Action: The 
Inter-American Human Rights System and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Goldman, Robert K, Available at: 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=facsch_lawrev 
218 Id.  
219 Universität Leiden (2015), NGO Participation in Regional Human Rights Systems, A Comparison of Europe and 
the Americas, M.F. Rietveld, Available at:  
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/33629/Rietveld-Myrinne-s1580868-MA%20Thesis-
2015.pdf?sequence=1 
220 Id.  
221  International Justice Resource Center (2017), Inter-American Human Rights System, Available at: 
www.ijrcenter.org/regional/inter-american-system/, http://www.ijrcenter.org/regional/inter-american-system/ 
222  Harvard International Law Journal (2013), Challenges to the Inter-American Human Rights System, Available 
at:  www.harvardilj.org/2013/12/challenges-to-the-inter-american-human-rights-system/. 
223 Id. 
Middle East Review | Issue No. 3 | November 2019 
 
39 
  
39 
 
 
The continued relevance of the Commission and the Inter-American system depends on the ability 
of the Member States to meet the following challenges. First, at the “conclusion” of the review 
States kept the strengthening process open, which poses a threat to the political independence of the 
IACHR.224 Second, the IACHR urgently needs a bigger budget.225 Without more resources, the IACHR 
may be unable to manage its workload, risking discredit.226 Third, and probably the most difficult, is the 
IACHR’s legitimacy deficit regarding the universality of the system, due to the fact that the most 
powerful country in the region, the US, has never ratified the American Convention on Human Rights.227  
B. African Human Rights System 
  
The African Commission for Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) demonstrates the potential 
strength of a human rights system that improves with significant influence from civil society and non-
governmental organizations. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted in 1981 by 
the Conference of the Heads of State and Governments of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).228 
The African Union (AU), which replaced the OAU in 2000, established the rights which are guaranteed 
229under the African Charter as principles and objectives in its Constitutive Act.  The AU rights include 
rights to fair trial, equality before the law, equal protection of the law, and recognizing Member States’ 
duty to guarantee the independence of courts and promote human rights.230  
 
Opening a new era of human rights protection in Africa, the Charter was drafted considering the 
legal texts of international and regional human rights protection systems as well as the legal traditions of 
the continent; hence the inclusion of peoples’ rights and civil, political, economic and social rights. The 
Charter’s mechanism for monitoring its implementation started in 1987.231 The mechanism has a dual 
promotion and protection mandate under Article 45 of the Charter.232 The promotional functions of the 
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Commission include the collection of documents and conducting research on African problems in the 
field of human rights; organizing seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminating information; 
making recommendations to governments and sending missions to gather information on the human 
rights situation in a State party.233 
  
The Commission has jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the African Charter at the request of a 
State party, an AU institution, or African non-governmental organizations (NGOs).234 However, the 
ACHPR has often been seen by observers as a “Sleeping Beauty in the Woods,”235 because it faces many 
challenges, including a lack of political will to ensure the system is effectively implemented and 
enhanced.236 However, African and international NGOs have taken a key role in the work of the 
Commission (notably through the presence of over 100 NGO representatives at each ACHPR session). 
They tried to push the Commission over the last decade towards greater independence,237 which makes it 
more inclusive of civil society, independent experts and unbiased and impartial decisions. This has led 
ACHPR to enhance its structure with the creation of special rapporteurs and working groups on special 
human rights issues, and secure funding to strengthen its human rights promotion and protection 
mandate.238 
 
IV. Challenges Facing the Progress of the Arab Human Rights System  
A. The 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights  
 
 On September 15, 1994, the Council239 of LAS adopted the first Arab Charter on Human 
Rights,240 a significant milestone for its 50th anniversary.241 The adoption of the Charter symbolized that 
LAS members recognized human rights and the importance of respecting human rights in the Arab 
World. The Preamble speaks of the principles of religions recognizing the right to a life with dignity 
based on freedom, justice, and peace.242 The Preamble reaffirmed the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as well as the provisions of the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.243 This is due to preambles of international instruments 
playing an important role in law, policy-making, and interpretations. Therefore, reaffirming the globally 
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recognized of UDHR and ICCPR and ICESCR is a matter of importance.244 However, there is significant 
tension between the Cairo Declaration245 and the UDHR concerning the concepts of universality and 
cultural-religious relativism with many, including Islamic jurists, calling into question the compatibility 
of the two instruments.246 
 
The Cairo Declaration conflicts with international human rights.247 The document provides only a 
subordinated status to religious minorities and prohibits conversion from Islam. It also presents glaring 
evidence of discrimination against women, providing the right to freedom of movement or marriage only 
to men.248 These shortcomings render the Declaration useless at best and at worst harmful for human 
rights. Not surprisingly, the only people who take the document seriously are critics of Islam who invoke 
it to argue the religion’s incompatibility with human rights.249 
 
Following the passage of the Charter, there were increasing criticisms of deficiencies by experts, 
NGOs, academics, and others asserting the 1994 Arab Charter is primitive because of the extremely 
limited system of monitoring states’ compliance with the Charter's provisions and the lack of 
representation of civil society organizations and independent experts.250 The sole monitoring mechanism 
consisted of presenting reports to an expert Committee, with no system of individual or state petitions to 
this Committee for significant violations of an article of this Charter by a state party.251 Numerous 
meetings and conferences were organized by civil society organizations in Europe and in the Arab World 
to push the Arab governments to modify the Charter.252 
 
B. LAS Human Rights Monitoring Bodies 
B-1. The Arab Permanent Committee on Human Rights (PACHR) 
  
The PACHR is responsible for establishing the rules of cooperation among the Member States in 
the field of human rights. Established in 1968 as a technical committee, it consists of one representative 
from each Member State who serves as a political representative.253 The Permanent Committee meets 
twice a year in Cairo, usually around January or February and June.254 The issues it considers during 
these meetings are limited to topics referred by the LAS Council, the Secretary-General, or the Member 
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States.255 The recommendations produced by these meetings are included in the reports of the Council of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.256 In 2007, the Permanent Committee’s responsibilities were outlined in 
Resolution 6826, Regular Session 1285 of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Permanent 
Committee does not have the ability to accept individual complaints or conduct country inquiries by 
request of CSOs, nor does it have any special procedures. 
 
B-2. The Arab Human Rights Committee 
 
The Arab Charter on Human Rights established the Arab Human Rights Committee (the 
Committee) as a treaty body with seven members, to be elected by secret ballot by the states parties every 
four years for a maximum of two terms. Only one of the members was a woman.257 The Committee does 
not have the authority to receive individual complaints regarding human rights violations committed by 
member states.258 The Committee represents an extremely weak mechanism for supervising and 
enforcing member states’ compliance with the Charter by international standards.259 Except for the fight 
against corruption, in the Arab League’s logic part of its internal security agenda, the commitments made 
in Tunis in 2004 with regard to democracy, the rule of law, and good governance have not been translated 
into regional action.260 
   
B-3. The Arab Commission for Human Rights & The 2004 Revised Arab Charter on 
Human Rights 
 
 The Arab Commission for Human Rights (ACHR) is an independent non-governmental 
organization dedicated to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the Arab 
world.261 Without any political affiliation, the Arab Commission for Human Rights is guided in its work 
by the principles established in, most notably, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and all other international human rights instruments.262The draft of 
2004 revised Arab Charter on Human Rights was prepared by ACHR, which has acted as a facilitator 
inviting the Arab states to present observations and proposals to improve the Charter. The ACHR does 
not have any affiliation with the LAS or the Arab Human Rights Committee that is a body of LAS.  
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The 2004 Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights 
 
A resolution passed on January 10, 2003, by the Arab Commission for Human Rights invited the 
Arab states to present observations and proposals to improve the Charter, with a promise to Arab states 
that the Commission would examine the Charter again in January 2004.263 On a parallel track, the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights invited many Arab independent human rights experts for a meeting in 
Cairo in December 2003 to also present some observations and proposals to improve the Charter.264 
Finally, on May 23, 2004, a new version of the Charter was presented to the Arab Summit in Tunisia. 
The 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights contains 53 articles after the Preamble.265  
 
The Preamble is the same as the first version, despite the significant criticisms about the 
incompatibility of the Cairo Declaration with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.266 Article 2 of 
the Charter is very similar to the second article in the International Covenants of 1966 concerning the 
rights of people (the Arab people) to self-determination, to control their natural wealth and resources, to 
freely determine the form of their political structure, and to freely pursue their economic, social, and 
cultural development.267 Article 3 importantly includes confirmation of equality between men and 
women in the Arab World.268 The revised Charter also protects children's rights (Article 3 & 34) and the 
rights of persons with handicaps (Article 40).269  
  
The main complaint with the 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights remains despite the 2004 
efforts to improve the Charter; there is no effective enforcement mechanism. Although, Article 33 of the 
Charter specifically mentions the status of women by stating “the State and society shall ensure the 
protection of the family, the strengthening of family ties, the protection of its members and 
the prohibition of all forms of violence or abuse in the relations among its members, and particularly 
against women and children,”270 at the same time, the Charter does not prohibit cruel, inhuman, or 
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degrading punishments, nor does it extend rights to non-citizens in many areas.271 It also allows for the 
imposition of restrictions on the exercise of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion far beyond 
international human rights law, which allows for restrictions only on the manifestations of a religion or 
belief, but not on the freedom to hold a religion or belief.272 Moreover, the Charter leaves many 
important rights to national legislation. For example, it allows for the imposition of the death penalty 
against children if national law allows it.273 It also leaves the regulation of rights and responsibilities of 
men and women in marriage and divorce to national law.274 Thus, the Charter mirrors to a large degree 
the areas of acceptance and reservations regarding the international human rights treaties signed by the 
Member States of the LAS. 
  
Article 43 of the Charter states “nothing in this Charter may be construed or interpreted as 
impairing the rights and freedoms protected by the domestic laws of the States parties or those set forth in 
the international and regional human rights instruments which the states parties have adopted or ratified, 
including the rights of women, the rights of children and the rights of minorities.”275 Although, Article 43 
addresses the interaction between the Arab Charter on Human Rights and the domestic laws of Arab 
states, as well as the relationship between the Charter and international law, in analyzing these 
interactions, the interpretation of the rights stipulated in the Charter should not be impaired by domestic 
laws restricting such rights.276 Many Arab, regional, and international organizations take the position they 
will not lobby actively for the ratification of the Charter because it conflicts with international law in 
many fundamental areas.277 States ratifying the Charter undertake changing their laws and policies in 
accordance with its provisions, but none have actually done so thus far.278 
 
In the end, the success of the Charter will depend on how seriously the Arab states and Arab 
human rights organizations decide to take it. Aside from the obvious question of whether Arab states will 
follow through in making actual changes in law and practices to conform with the Charter, there is the 
question of whether the Arab civil society organizations will engage in the process in the same way they 
do with other regional and international systems.279 For the Charter to succeed in furthering human rights, 
Arab governments would have to be willing to re-open the debate on some provisions that clearly 
contradict international standards. Another measure of the significance of the Charter will be whether, 
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once states submit their reports on the measures they have taken to conform to the Charter, serious 
debates on human rights start to take place within the walls of the LAS.280 
 
B. NGO’s Participation  
 
Responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights within inter-governmental 
organizations is often shared by several organs within the same organization. For example, in the UN 
system the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
share a mandate to promote human rights among the Member States. In contrast, the LAS’s system 
delegates this power to one political organ, the Arab Human Rights Committee. Officially, the 
Committee can only receive reports and information from NGOs registered in their countries of origin.281 
Therefore, this excludes a large number of human rights organizations in the region that are refused 
official recognition due to the repressive measures applied to associations in their country. Envisioning a 
process of exchange with civil society is rarely part of the master plan designed for inter-governmental 
bodies. 
  
The integration of civil society into formal proceedings is not only due to NGO efforts, but also 
the result of treaty bodies seeing the benefits of promoting and strengthening civil society’s position and 
giving its observations more far-reaching and sustainable effect.282 Regular meetings between the 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH),283 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies 
(CIHRS),284 the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR),285 and others, including the Arab Human 
Rights Committee’s Secretariat, and efforts to improve interaction between the Committee and its 
member organizations, have made it possible for some NGOs in Algeria and Jordan to submit alternative 
reports prior to the examination of their respective country’s State report.286 This is despite the fact that 
not all of these partner organizations are officially registered. Thus, the information received by the 
Committee from unrecognized NGOs cannot be published on the Committee’s website and the experts 
will not expressly refer to them in their conclusions. The information provided by unrecognizable NGOs 
may be used in the preparatory stages of the examination; however, this information does not effectively 
examine the human rights records of the Member States, nor effectively engage in resolving human rights 
issues.287  
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According to Article 45 of the Charter,288 the Arab Human Rights Committee shall establish its 
own rules of procedure and shall meet at the LAS headquarters in Cairo.289 The Charter contains no 
further details about the Committee and the Committee’s relationship with other organs of the LAS. Soon 
after its establishment, the Committee’s experts decided it should remain independent from the LAS 
General-Secretariat, including the human rights department.290 The Committee has thus managed to raise 
its own funding from the State parties.291 The Arab Human Rights Committee performed its first 
examination of State reports in 2012, starting with Jordan in March, Algeria in October, and Bahrain in 
February 2013.292 The concluding remarks of the Committee are now published on its website in 
Arabic.293  
 
After the entry into force of the revised Arab charter in 2008, FIDH and partners followed and 
accompanied the establishment of the Arab Human Committee by submitting information and 
recommendations (especially on the necessity to have an independent body, composed of independent 
experts) to the human rights department then to the Committee itself. FIDH organized, together with 
Amnesty International the first meeting between the members of the committee and regional and 
international organizations in 2009.294  
  
The Arab Human Rights Committee’s experts agreed on the principle of wider collaboration with 
NGOs but seemed to move slowly at first. The Committee consulted regional and international NGOs on 
the implementation of their internal rules and then organized interaction with local NGOs, including an 
agreement to receive shadow reports.295 This makes it even more important that clear criteria and 
objectives are deemed to grant observer or consultative status to NGOs.  
 
In March 2011, the LAS Council adopted a resolution calling upon the General-Secretariat to set 
forth suggestions on an effective review of the role of both the PACHR and its affiliate sub-committee of 
experts.296 However, it would be ineffectual and unproductive to strengthen the PACHR’s mandate on 
human rights promotion and protection without properly amending the Arab Charter on Human Rights. 
Thus, simultaneous reform is needed in these two areas; improving the charter and strengthening the 
organs of the Arab Human Rights system.297  
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Strengthening the organs of the Arab Human Rights system could be achieved through the use of 
investigative missions and effective reporting, as well as providing the LAS with an opportunity to 
publicly qualify situations by reference to international standards and decide on interim measures on a 
given situation, whilst also providing redress for victims.298 Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely the victims 
of human rights violations would bring cases before special procedures belonging to a system which the 
perpetrating states are political representatives.299 The only means of securing a stronger and more 
effective system of human rights protection, therefore, is to rely on the strengthening of the Arab Human 
Rights Committee as an independent treaty body attached to the Arab Charter on Human Rights.300 
 
D.   The Arab Court of Human Rights  
  
Another key omission in the enforcement system is the lack of an Arab Court of Human Rights. 
NGOs have taken key roles in enhancing the credibility of the European Court of Human Rights 
decisions. The Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Human Rights in 1954 and 
established its Court, based in Strasbourg, France, in 1959.301 The Convention covers a vast geographical 
area and is confronted with a wide diversity of legal systems.302 The European Court is not a court of 
appeals and is primarily used for claims of violations of the European Convention.303 Although, the Court 
is faced with many challenges, including long procedures often lasting years and the failure of state 
complaints; almost none of the state parties to the European Convention have ever filed a complaint 
against another state for violating the European Convention. The Court has received a large number of 
complaints from individuals (more than 120,000 were pending at the end of 2012).304  
 
Additionally, the Court can boast of a number of successes, among which its power to order 
provisional measures, usually implemented by states, and the development of its jurisprudence, including 
decisions on more geo-strategic issues arising between states.305 Here again, civil society organizations 
have played a tremendous role in establishing, supporting and helping to develop the European human 
rights system.306 NGOs still play a fundamental part today as they participate in procedures before the 
Court, represent victims, and act as third-parties intervening in support of complaints to highlight specific 
 
298 Id. 
299 Id.  
300 Open Society Foundations, Arab Regional Office (2015), The League of Arab States, Human Rights Standards and 
Mechanisms, Towards Further Civil Society    Engagement, A Manual for Practitioners, Mervat Rishmawi, Available 
at:https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/league-arab-states-manual-20151125.pdf 
301 Directorate-General For External Policies Policy Department (2010), The Role Of Regional Human Rights 
Mechanisms, Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/410206/EXPO-
DROI_ET(2010)410206_EN.pdf  
302 Id.  
303 Id.  
304 Id. 
305 European Journal of International Law (2014), The Successes and Challenges for the European Court, Seen from the 
Outside Available at:  www.ejiltalk.org/the-successes-and-challenges-for-the-european-court-seen-from-the-
outside/.https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-successes-and-challenges-for-the-european-court-seen-from-the-outside/ 
306 NGO Participation in Regional Human Rights Systems, A Comparison of Europe and the Americas, M.F. 
Rietveld,2015, Available at:  https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/33629/Rietveld-Myrinne-
s1580868-MA%20Thesis-2015.pdf?sequence=1 
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issues.307 They also remain active in the reform of the Court to prevent states from significantly reducing 
its powers.308  
  
The European Court could be a source of inspiration for a future Arab Court of Human Rights, 
notwithstanding the challenges NGOs should ensure are addressed, such as the Court’s ability to 
adequately address high numbers of complaints, the execution of judgments, and the refusal of certain 
states to implement the Court’s decisions.309  
 
LAS and OHCHR held a conference in Cairo on May 22-24, 2014.310 LAS and the Bahrain 
National Institution for Human Rights organized another meeting in Bahrain on May 25-26, 2014.311 The 
LAS Secretary General, Nabil Al-Arbabi, announced at both meetings the expert committee of the LAS 
had finalized its work regarding the Arab Court of Human Rights and the final draft would be submitted 
for the approval of the ministerial council in its next meeting.312 Although, The Statute of the Arab Court 
of Human Rights was approved by the Ministerial Council of the LAS on 7 September 2014,313 it has 
faced criticisms, as it is not gender-inclusive, does not authorize courts to prescribe interim measures, 
does not include guarantees for the protection of victims, witnesses, and civil society organizations, and 
mechanisms and processes for judges’ nomination are not clear.314 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Despite the establishment of the PACHR and the Arab Charter on Human Rights, Arab countries 
lack an effective regional human right system. This, in addition to enabling individuals and civil society 
to get access to justice and exercise their right to a fair trial even a quasi-judicial body, will not protect 
and promote human rights as it should. This is because the proposed Arab Court of Human Rights looks 
like an empty vessel without substantial changes to the Statute. If the Court is to be effective, it must be 
able to order interim or provisional measures, to order measures capable of protecting victims, witnesses 
and other participants in Court proceedings from reprisals, the host State must be required to provide the 
 
307 Id. 
308 Id. 
309 European Journal of International Law (2014), The Successes and Challenges for the European Court, Seen from the 
Outside Available at:  www.ejiltalk.org/the-successes-and-challenges-for-the-european-court-seen-from-the-
outside/.https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-successes-and-challenges-for-the-european-court-seen-from-the-outside/ 
310 Human Rights Watch (2014), Proposed Arab Court of Human Rights: An Empty Vessel Without Substantial Changes to 
the Draft Statute, Available at: www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/06/proposed-arab-court-human-rights-empty-vessel-without-
substantial-changes-draft.  
311 Id. 
312  Human Rights Watch (2014), New Arab Human Rights Court Is Doomed from the Start, Available at: 
www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/26/new-arab-human-rights-court-doomed-start.  
313 Human Rights Law Research Guide - LibGuides at University of Melbourne, Available at: 
unimelb.libguides.com/human_rights_law/regional/arab. 
314 Human Rights Watch (2014), Proposed Arab Court of Human Rights: An Empty Vessel Without Substantial Changes to 
the Draft Statute, Available at: www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/06/proposed-arab-court-human-rights-empty-vessel-without-
substantial-changes-draft. 
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necessary guarantees for the Court and its staff. Therefore, there must be mechanisms to ensure that the 
Court’s judgments are actually implemented in practice.315  
 
By denying the right of victims to have direct recourse to the Court, the Statute defeats the very 
purpose and objective of establishing the Arab Court of Human Rights. Amendments to the Statute’s 
access provisions should be introduced to ensure direct access at a minimum for individuals who allege 
they have been a victim of a violation of a right within the jurisdiction of the Court.316 Further reforms 
needed include proper guarantees for the independence and impartiality of the Court and its judges, a 
requirement for the Court to interpret the Arab Charter of Human Rights consistently with States’ other 
international law obligations, and for the Court to have broad discretion to decide whether cases are 
admissible, without the undue restrictions of a strict prerequisite to exhaust local remedies.317  
Unfortunately, the Arab system of human rights lacks in many ways in comparison to its European, 
African and Inter-American counterparts.  
 
The shortcomings of the Arab system of human rights are evident through the region’s recent 
struggle with regressive human rights violations. Particularly in the wake of Arab Spring and later 
revolutions that the Committee has ignored, the LAS has instead focused its attention on decisions related 
to reform initiatives in Arab countries and the political bodies of the LAS.318 Therefore, balances of 
power and political interests continue to be the main motives behind these decisions.  
  
After the ratification of the 2004 charter, there have been ongoing discussions about enhancing 
the Arab human rights system. For instance, from February 16-18, 2013, more than 50 human rights 
defenders representing national, regional, and international NGOs, as well as human rights experts from 
different regional and universal human rights systems gathered in Cairo, Egypt.319 This gathering was 
convened to discuss the challenges faced by the LAS in enhancing the protection and promotion of 
human rights in the region and to propose visions for the reform and strengthening of the LAS’ human 
rights component.320 The Secretary-General of the LAS encouraged participants to recognize the need to 
reform on the fourth anniversary of the Arab Human Rights Day where he recognized the need to reform 
the Arab Charter on Human Rights. It has become a pressing requirement that the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights is brought into conformity with universal human rights standards.321 
  
 
315 International Commission of Jurists, News: Press Releases, available at: www.icj.org/arab-court-of-human-rights compr 
ehensive-amendments-required-before-ratification-new-report/. 
316
 Id. 
317
 International Commission of Jurists (2014), Arab Court Statement, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Arab-
Court-Statement-June-2014-ENG-FINAL1.pdf  
318 Human Rights Law Research Guide - LibGuides at University of Melbourne, available at: 
unimelb.libguides.com/human_rights_law/regional/arab. 
319 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2013), The League of Arab States in the Wake of the Arab Spring, 
Mervat Rishmawi, Available at: http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Arab-Leage.pdf 
320 Id.  
321 Id. 
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State parties affirmed the LAS needs to be impartial and fair in its decisions on human rights 
issues throughout the Arab region and it needs to address other pressing human rights situations in the 
Arab region, including in Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, 
Yemen and the Occupied Palestinian Territories with the same degree of determination and persistence it 
has shown over the situation in Libya and Syria.322 State parties reaffirmed no justification – political, 
cultural, religious or economic – can  derogate from the obligations of State and non-State actors in the 
Arab region to respect, protect, and fulfill universally recognized human rights standards and norms. 
State parties also asserted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in its current form is inconsistent with 
international human rights standards and lacks effective guarantees to ensure the aspirations of the Arab 
people for an effective human rights system.323   
  
Participants stressed the LAS cannot take on a new role in democratic transition, consult with 
civil society, nor support its claims in that regard, without operating an effective change in the modality 
of its relationship with civil society organizations by setting forth mechanisms and unambiguous criteria 
based on transparency to ensure a permanent relationship across all the LAS bodies. LAS has to clarify 
the protection mandate of the LAS by enhancing its monitoring capacity. Means to do this include, but 
are not limited to: 1) enabling the issuance of recommendations and resolutions on the human rights 
situation in the Member States, 2) enabling the establishment of independent special procedures to 
receive information from any source and investigate allegations, and 3) publicly qualify the human rights 
situation in the Member States and establish an independent complaint mechanism to deal with individual 
and collective communications received in accordance with established practice in other systems. LAS 
has to take into account the experience accumulated through the development of human rights protection 
324mechanisms at the regional and international levels.
 
322 International Foundation for Human Rights (2013), The Arab League and Human Rights: Challenges Ahead Regional 
Seminar held in Cairo on 16-17 February, available at:  https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_lea_uk-lddouble.pdf 
323 Id.  
324 Id.  
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COMMERCIAL AGENCY LAW 
Reflection on Exclusivity of Commercial Agency in Jordan 
Bashar H. Malkawi* 
I. Introduction 
  Any foreign manufacturer desiring to market its products in Jordan has several courses 
open to it. The foreign manufacturer could establish wholly-owned subsidiary in Jordan or enter 
into a licensing or joint venture agreement with a company doing business in Jordan. If the 
foreign company wants a less significant presence, it is left with the alternative of having a local 
commercial agent market and sells its products.    Commercial agency has taken an increasing 
share of domestic and international business. The number of agencies and percentage of total 
retail sales has grown rapidly, far outpacing economies as a whole.325  
  The law of commercial agency in Jordan is statutory. Agency is subject to regulation 
through the Jordanian Civil and Commercial Codes.326 A basic law also exists regulating agency 
legal relationships; Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001.327 
Given the high financial commitment of agency investments, and the time duration of 
most agency agreements, it is not surprising that the legal issues surrounding exclusivity and 
termination are among the most controversial in agency law. Clauses governing exclusivity and 
termination are likely the most important provisions in the agreement, as they limit what an agent 
may do.  
The purpose of this article is to study certain aspects-exclusivity and termination- of 
commercial agency according to the Jordanian law.328 The article is divided into three sections. 
Section two explains the general rules governing commercial agency in Jordan. Section three 
 
* Bashar H. Malkawi is Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. He holds 
S.J.D in International Trade Law from American University, Washington College of Law and LL.M in International 
Trade Law from the University of Arizona. 
325 See Augustin Jausas, International Encyclopedia of Agency and Distribution Agreements 23-26 (2008) (agency 
contracts run to the tune of billions of dollars worldwide).  
326 The Arab legal system distinguishes between acts to which private persons are parties (civil acts) and acts to 
which merchants are parties (commercial acts). The former are generally subject to the civil code and the latter to 
the commercial code. The civil and commercial codes complement each other in many areas including agency 
relations. See H S Shaaban, Commercial Transactions in the Middle East: What Law Governs? 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l 
Bus. 157, 160-163 (1999). See also See Mohamed El-Sayed El-Keky, Commercial Law 78 (in Arabic) (2004).    
327 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, Official Gazette No. 4496 (July 16, 2001).  
328 The article examines mainly the agency laws of Jordan. Reference to laws of other Arab countries will be made 
when necessary. The agency laws in the countries discussed share similar characteristics. For example, in Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where private enterprise is encouraged, foreign suppliers must use 
agents in practically all instances. In general, these countries reserve agency activities to their own nationals. Agents 
are regulated by mandatory registration procedures, and they are protected against arbitrary termination by their 
foreign principals. See Sections II and III infra.   
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analyzes exclusivity of commercial agents. Finally, the article concludes by summarizing the 
main issues discussed and provides recommendations to streamline agency law in Jordan. 
II. What is an Agency? 
        The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001 defines a commercial 
agent broadly so that it covers commission agent, agent who distributes on his own behalf 
(distributor), and agent who distributes on behalf of a foreign company or a trader whose 
headquarter is located outside Jordan (commercial agent).329 Moreover, the Commercial Code 
defines commercial agency as an agency related to commercial acts involving an agent who 
carries out his duties in the name of his principal.330 The concepts of commercial agency and 
other intermediaries such as distributorship are not clearly distinguished in the Jordanian laws.331 
As a result, regulators and practitioners alike may suffer from uncertainty about the exact kinds 
of commercial arrangements intended to be regulated as agencies.  
The Jordanian law should define a commercial agency, in a straightforward manner, as an 
independent individual or juristic person who is contractually controlled by a principal and 
assigned to promote, sell, distribute products and provide services in the name and on behalf of 
the principal for remuneration.332 The distributor is an independent contractor who buys and 
resells for his own account and is normally free to fix his own resale prices.333 The distributor 
must generally pay the manufacturer regardless of whether or not he has been paid by his own 
customers. The distributor thus acts on his own behalf and assumes the risk of possible 
 
329 A commercial middleman is defined as any person who carries on the profession of mediation with a view to 
concluding or facilitating the inclusion of commercial dealings and transactions, in return for a fee provided that 
such a person is not an employee or a deputy of either one of the two parties to such commercial transactions. Id. art. 
2. While Arab jurisdictions that regulate commercial agency share common definitional approaches, each 
jurisdiction has its own definitional subtleties and mix of exclusions and exemptions. See Egyptian Code of 
Commerce of 1999, art. 5; Kuwaiti Code of Commerce of 1980, art. 271; Lebanese Commercial Code of 1942, art. 
272; Moroccan Commercial Code of 1996, art. 393; Syrian Code of Commerce of 2007, art. 154; and UAE 
Commercial Transactions Law of 1993, 217.   
330 Acts defined as commercial in the commercial include purchase of goods intended to be sold as they are or after 
their manufacture, leasing of goods for lease, exchange operations, banking operations, land and maritime and air 
transport, brokerage and commission, insurance, public entertainment, and business agencies. Other commercial acts 
which are similar to these acts by nature or aim are considered commercial acts. See Jordanian Code of Commerce 
No. 12 of 1966, art. 6.1 & 2, 81.1.  
331 Commercial agencies and distributorships are essentially different and governed by different laws on Western 
legal systems. See Rochelle B. Spandorf, Franchise Player, 29 Los Angeles Lawyer 34, 43 (2006). See also Uri 
Benoliel,  Rethinking the Distributor-Manufacturer Fiduciary Relationship: A Marketing Channels Perspective, 45 
Am. Bus. L.J. 187, 215 (2008).  
332 A person is independent if he is essentially free to arrange his activity and determine his hours of work. It is 
important to point out the distinction between an independent agent and an employee. Any person who is regularly 
entrusted to solicit business for an entrepreneur or conclude business in his name is deemed an employee. Whether 
someone is independent turns on the factual circumstances of each case; merely having an agreement declare 
independence or non-employee status may not suffice. 
333 In the agency situation, the manufacturer retains an absolute control of the price at which his products will be 
sold in Jordan.  
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insolvency of the customers, which is not the case for the agent.334 In contrast with a distributor, 
a commercial agent does not own the goods and thus must render the proceeds of his sales to the 
principal.    
Agents in Jordan are only subject to certain nationality and registration requirements.335 
There is no age, experience in the agency's field of activity, or financial restrictions as requisites 
for registration. An individual agent should be a Jordanian national.336 A company, acting as an 
agent, must also be Jordanian.337 The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 
does not set parameters for determining how a company could qualify as a Jordanian. Such 
parameters would have included majority of Jordanian ownership, having an office in Jordan, or 
majority of board of directors are of Jordanian nationality.  
In addition to the nationality condition, a commercial agent must be duly registered at the 
Commercial Agents Registry of the Ministry of Industry and Trade.338 A person who desires to 
practice as a commercial agent must submit an application to the Registrar. The application 
contains personal information of the agent and the principal and a copy of the agency 
agreement.339 The agency agreement may include many provisions, but the most crucial which 
ought to be included are territory, products, exclusivity, commission rate, effective term, just 
cause for termination, compliance with law, and governing law and dispute resolution. 
A commercial agent will be crossed off the Register in case of submitting incorrect 
information, termination of the agency agreement, or expiry of its term.340 Non-registration 
results in a fine.341 Non-registration does not invalidate an unregistered commercial agent. Thus, 
a failure to register will not prevent a commercial agent from practicing as such. A commercial 
agent must be duly registered in order to qualify for the protection and enjoy the privileges of the 
law.342 An agent will not be entitled to any indemnity upon termination if the agent is not duly 
registered with the commercial registrar at the time his contract is terminated by the principal. 
 
334 In practice, however, the contrast between an agent and a distributor is often not so marked. This is the case, for 
example, where the manufacturer participates in or follows closely the activities of the distributor, or where, for a 
variety of reasons, the distributor's gross profit upon his resale of the goods is not more than the commission which a 
sales agent would normally receive on such a sale. This is also the case where the distributor is granted payment 
terms by the manufacturer which exceed those the distributor normally grants to his own customers. 
335 The laws of other Arab countries imposes financial and professionals qualifications for practicing agency. See 
Fredrick J. Taylor Jr. & Howard O. Weissman, Middle East Agency Law Survey: Legal Requirements for 
Commercial Agency Arrangements in the Middle East: A Survey of Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates, 14 Int'l Law. 331 (1980). 
336 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 3.    
337 Id. 
338 Id. art. 5.  
339 Id. art. 6.a(1) & (2). See also Howard L. Stovall, 'Short Form' Agreements under Arab Commercial Agency Law: 
Some Legal and Practical Issues, ABA Middle East Law Committee Newsletter (September 2016) (The commercial 
agency agreement must be drafted in Arabic or accompanied by an Arabic translation. Preparing this Arabic 
translation could be relatively costly if the parties commercial agency agreement is lengthy, and a local commercial 
agent would usually prefer to avoid incurring this translation cost).  
340 Id. art. 9.  
341 Id. art. 18.a(3).  
342 Id. art. 10.a. 
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However, even if an agent were not so registered when he entered into the agency agreement and 
he so represented in the contract, he could probably under certain circumstances register after the 
signing of the sales agency contract, thus defeating any representation or undertaking not to 
register which he might have made in the sales agency contract.  
An agent must have a direct relationship or link with his principal.343 The direct 
relationship requirement is enforced through the registration process and the law does not grant 
any exceptions or discretion in this regard. The direct relationship requirement is intended to 
prohibit the use of sub-agents. Without the direct relationship requirement, a commercial agent 
would become sub-agent of foreign parties intervening between him and the producers or 
manufacturer. This type of intervention, if permitted, would defeat the requirement that the agent 
must be a Jordanian national. Another reason that may justify the requirement of direct 
relationship is to maintain prices of products low for consumers. Interference of many 
intermediaries could increase costs of production. However, taking into consideration the 
continuous exorbitant prices of products in Jordan, as well as in other Arab countries, makes this 
reasoning a mere illusion.344 Prices are inflated anyway and generally increased by commissions 
paid to hidden middlemen and brokers. The reasonable justification for the rule of direct 
relationship is to maintain the requirement of nationality and make commercial agency a closed 
circuit.   
The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 does not address in details 
rights and obligations of parties to an agency contract. The Law of Commercial Agents and 
Intermediaries of 2001 states, in one article only, that an agent is under an obligation to keep 
sufficient quantities of spare parts for the products and offer facilities for after-sale services.345 
The bulk of the parties’ rights and obligations are found in the Commercial and Civil Codes. The 
parties cannot modify these rights and obligations by agreement as they are statutory duties. 
The primary duty for an agent is to carry out the authority granted to him by the 
principal.346 In carrying out his authority, the agent must act with the care of an ordinary 
person.347 An agent receives the funds of his principal as a trustee.348 As such, the agent the 
liable if the funds are lost due to his negligence. The products must be sold at a price fixed by the 
principal.349 Hence, an agent is not free to sell the products at a lower price or any other price. 
 
343 The commercial agency laws of Egypt, Kuwait, Syria, and UAE have similar requirement of direct relationship. 
See Thomas F. Clasen, International Agency and Distribution Agreements: Middle East/Africa/Asia/Pacific 25-31 
(1994).   
344 See Taking the Strain; Food Prices and Protest, The Economist (May 10, 2008) (As a result of food inflation, 
millions of people are being pushed into hunger and malnutrition—and 30-odd countries face social upheaval unless 
food policy improved. In the Middle East, the part of the world most dependent on food imports, there have been 
demonstrations and strikes in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan. But all three countries withstood more serious food riots 
in the late 1970s and 1980s. Some countries in the Middle East, such as Syria, have so far survived demonstrations 
by issuing ration cards or hiking wages).  
345 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 11. 
346 An agent may exceed the authority granted by the principal is the outcome is beneficial to the latter. See 
Jordanian Civil Code No. 43 of 1976, art. 840.  
347 Id. art. 841.  
348 Id. art. 846. See also Jordanian Commercial Code, art. 84.   
349 See Jordanian Civil Code, supra note 26, art. 852.  
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The agent, as part of the agency contract, must report to the principal the agency’s activities and 
other information regarding its performance.350 The purpose of this reporting obligation is to 
keep the principal abreast of the affairs of the agency and to act accordingly, if necessary.      
As a commercial agent has certain duties, the principal is also bound by certain duties. 
For example, the principal is under an obligation to remunerate the agent.351        The Jordanian 
law does not specify any remuneration maximum. The agent's remuneration could be based on a 
percentage of the value of the contract obtained through the agent. Moreover, the law does not 
specify if the commercial agent has a right to remuneration for the business concluded which is 
to be attributed to his activity. In some cases, an agent may have the right to remuneration 
without having conducted any attributable activity. If, for instance, an agent is assigned an 
exclusive sales area or a defined group of customers, he has the right to claim remuneration for 
all contracts concluded with persons within the scope of the area or with the designated 
customers, even though he did not actually participate in the transaction. The law does not 
determine when the remuneration is due. It could be due upon the completion of the supplier's 
performance of the transaction. Unless otherwise provided by contract, the principal could 
account for remunerations on a monthly basis. 
The principal is bound by the agent’s actions.352 However, the agent is jointly and 
severally liable with the principal to the local merchant for whose benefit a contract has been 
concluded until all the terms and conditions of the contract have been performed.353 Finally, the 
principal is liable for any damages caused to the agent through the ordinary performance of the 
agency.354 The principal is not liable if the damage is caused by the agent’s own negligence.   
Courts in Jordan have exclusive jurisdiction in settling disputes arising out of commercial 
agency contracts.355 A foreign court cannot decide such disputes. Moreover, the use of arbitration 
is not permitted.356 The wording of the law means that the parties do not have the choice to use 
arbitration even after a dispute has risen. The exclusive jurisdiction of Jordanian courts is thus 
mandatory and leaves no room for using other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. There 
is no obvious reason as to why the law grants courts the exclusive jurisdiction in settling 
commercial agency disputes without any exceptions. The exclusive jurisdiction of Jordanian 
courts could be intended to protect local agents by not using foreign courts which they are not 
familiar with. 
The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 provides that after a certain 
length of time, three years post contract termination or term expiry, claims arising out of agency 
contracts will not be heard.357 This rule is founded upon considerations of public policy. 
Documents may be lost, witnesses may be dead, and the recollection of events long past may 
 
350 Id. art. 856. 
351 Id. art. 857. 
352 Id. art. 859.  
353 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 15.   
354 See Jordanian Civil Code, supra note 26, art. 859. 
355 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 16.a.    
356 In general, arbitration can be used to settle all civil and commercial disputes. See Omar Aljazy, Arbitration in 
Jordan: From Old to New, 25 Journal of International Arbitration 219, 223 (2008)  
357 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 16.b.  
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have become dim. Passage of time extinguishes the legal right of enforcement; it does not 
extinguish the underlying obligation.358 Parties cannot contract out by denying the lapse of a 
period of time. Courts would invalidate such a provision on the ground that it contravenes public 
policy.  
III. Exclusivity of Commercial Agency 
        Exclusivity exists when a manufacturer utilizes only one agent for the sale of his 
products. The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 and related laws do not 
regulate the exclusivity clause. In contrast to some legal systems mainly in the Gulf States-
Kuwait and UAE, the Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries does not set out the basic 
elements which a contract of commercial agency must contain.359 Rather, the Jordanian 
Legislature left the exclusivity provision to the agreement of the parties. In other words, 
exclusivity is determined by general principals of contract and is a matter of negotiation between 
a foreign principal and its Jordanian commercial agent. In practice, all commercial agents are 
Jordanian nationals and enjoy exclusive privileges.  
The first inquiry into exclusivity involves the express language of the agency agreement 
between the parties. Agency can be de facto exclusive without an express agreement between 
manufacturer and agent.  
A manufacturer can simply appoint an agent to a particular geographical area and impose 
limitations that confine the agent’s sales to that area. For example, a cheese manufacturer might 
expressly prohibit each agent from selling cheese outside its assigned territory. This type of 
restriction can be referred to as an "exclusive territory" as it results in a closed territory.360 A 
manufacturer can agree that the agent will sell the manufacturer's product only within a specified 
territory. This arrangement, which can be referred to as creating an "exclusive sales territory," 
limits the agent's freedom to deal with other manufacturers. In other words, the agent is not free 
to sell the goods of other manufacturers in the designated areas. A manufacturer may also forbid 
its agents to sell to certain designated customers or customer classes.361 These types of agency 
restraints involve the allocation of customers or classes of customers among agents on the basis 
of characteristics other than geographic location. The manufacturer may reserve certain accounts 
to certain agent because, among other things, it is more qualified to serve the special needs of 
those customers. In addition, the manufacturer may assign a class of customers to some, but not 
all, agents so as to permit agent specialization.  
 
358 Jurisprudence of Arab countries allow an action to enforce a claim of right to be barred by the passage of time. 
However, the Sharia does not recognize the legal notion of passage of time as extinguishing any right. This 
distinction between a legal right and its enforcement, which is cogent, has greatly influenced the laws of Arab 
countries. See Mahir Jalili, Time Bar Clauses in Saudi Arabian Contracts, 13 International Construction Law 
Review 488, 490-91 (1996). 
359 See Kuwaiti Code of Commerce, art. 274. 
360 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private Business: A 
"Trade Law Approach" for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 545, 550 
(1996).  
361 The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001 does not address customer restraints. 
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 The question is whether the manufacturer, having granted the agent territorial exclusivity, 
may, thereafter, lawfully engage in market expansion conduct designed to increase the 
manufacturer's market penetration within the territory already provided to the manufacturer's 
agent. Agents fearing encroachment of their established and well-developed territories could 
respond by filing lawsuits against the manufacturer. The encroachment of the manufacturer 
violates his contractual obligations to the dealer.  
A. The Law and Economics of Competitive Market 
        Competition is the linchpin of the free market system. A market is considered 
competitive if individual firms in that market have little or no power to influence the price or 
other terms on which products are sold.362 By ensuring that resources are allocated efficiently 
and by spurring innovation, competitive markets ultimately maximize consumer welfare. 
The relationship between competition and commercial agency is particularly relevant to 
so-called "vertical restraints".363 Vertical restraints frequently involve manufacturers and 
distributors. Vertical restraints typically relate to the geographic territories or classes of 
customers to which distributors sell, the degree of exclusivity the manufacturer or the distributor 
can count on from the other, and the prices at which distributors sell. The negative anti-
competitive effects of exclusivity can be considerable.  
Exclusivity of commercial agency can be a restraint of trade or monopolization.364 
Exclusivity can raise barriers to entry or market access and thus enhance unilateral price-raising 
power. The loss of business resulting from exclusivity could lead to claims of anti-monopoly 
violations by excluded parties.365 An exclusive agency can eliminate rivalry among agents in the 
sale of the manufacturer's product and has the potential of permitting the authorized agent 
himself to exercise some market power.366 However, the manufacturer's or agent's purpose could 
be not to limit rivalry in itself or to permit an agent to exercise market power but rather to render 
more efficient the distribution of his product. The manufacturer would not grant the exclusive 
 
362 See Michal S. Gal, Imported Antitrust Competition Policy for Small Market Economies 35 (2003). See also 
Michal S. Gal, Market Conditions under the Magnifying Glass: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal Competition 
Policy, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 303, 314 (2002).      
363 See Jessica L. Taralson, What Would Sherman Do? Overturning the Per Se Illegality of Minimum Vertical Price 
Restraints under the Sherman Act in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. V. PSKS, Inc. was not as Reasonable as 
it Semmed, 31 Hamline L. Rev. 549, 556 (2008). See Barbara Ann White, Black and White Thinking in the Gray 
Areas of Antitrust: The Dismantling of Vertical Restraints Regulation, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1991). See also Val 
D. Ricks and R. Chet Loftis, Seeing the Diagonal Clearly: Telling Vertical From Horizontal in Antitrust Law, 28 U. 
Tol. L. Rev. 151, 159 (1996).   
364 See Lahouel, Competition Laws in MENA: An Assessment of the Status Quo and the Relevance of a WTO 
Agreement, 6-7 (The Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey: Cairo 2000). For an 
examination of the competing view of antitrust law see Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust 
Policy, 86 Tulane L. Rev. 1 (1991).  
365 In principle, Jordan competition law covers the entire economy; yet it provides several important exemptions. For 
example, competition law does not apply if other legal provisions do not allow competition in a market for certain 
goods or services. Such provisions take precedence over the provisions of the competition law. See Jordan 
Provisional Anti-Trust Law No. 49 of 2002, Official Gazette No. (4560), art. 7 (August 15, 2002). 
366 The Kuwaiti Antitrust Law, for example, prohibits abusive use of a dominant position. See Lahouel, supra note 
44, 8. See also El-Dean, Privatisation and the Creation of a Market-based Legal System: The Case of Egypt 167 
(Egypt competition law forbids exploitative behavior) (Brill Academics: Leiden 2002). 
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agency unless he believed it would make the distribution of his product more efficient. 
Exclusivity can be lawful in the absence of monopolistic purpose or anticompetitive effect i.e. 
the maintenance of a minimum pricing. That exclusive agency is lawful remains to be tested in 
courts.367 Therefore, the legality of exclusive agency, under anti-monopoly laws, remains intact. 
National authorities in Jordan systematically favor the interests of domestic commercial 
agents over the interests of domestic consumers. For example, customs authorities will prevent 
the entry into Jordan of goods originating with a foreign manufacturer who has a duly registered 
agent for these goods in Jordan but are shipped through a person other than the registered agent. 
Jordanian courts can issue an injunction to prevent parallel importation made by a third party in 
breach of the exclusivity clause. Parallel imports involve the importation of genuine goods 
outside the authorized distribution channels.368 In other words, parallel importation is the 
importation of goods from a foreign source by bypassing the authorized local agent therefore 
allowing the sale of goods directly to retailers or consumers. The matter of parallel importation is 
addressed through case law as the following case, concerning a Jordanian company called Jordan 
Mechanical Engineering Company (“Jordan Mechanical”) illustrates.    
In this case, Jordan Mechanical was acting as an agent of Maggi” chicken stock cubes 
which is a product of Nestle, a Swiss company.369 It came to the knowledge of Jordan 
Mechanical that some Jordanian traders, such as Abdul-Fattah Qinno, imported about 1000 box 
of Maggi cubes (product of Egypt). These products did not conform to the required 
specifications. The Court of Cassation found that Jordan Mechanical was entitled to preserve its 
rights as the authorized agent of the manufacturing company for marketing certain goods.    
By bringing the case discussed above, the agent sought to protect regular trade channels. 
Local agents have built the goodwill of imported products by marketing plan, promotional 
efforts, and providing a product warranty through after-sale servicing. The purpose of all these 
programs is to maintain clients and increase the sale of goods. Agents provide services and incur 
costs that parallel importers may not provide or incur. Thus, parallel importers free ride at the 
expense of authorized distributors. In addition, parallel imports may damage product quality 
control. Poor quality could cause consumer confusion and diminish the reputation of the 
manufacturer and agent.  
Conclusion 
        A successful relationship between the foreign principal and his local agent must be based 
on familiarity with the laws of Jordan. The Civil and Commercial Codes as well as the Law of 
Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 govern agency relationships in Jordan. Many of 
these codes and laws overlap leading sometimes to confusion. For instance, parties’ rights and 
obligations are found in the Commercial Code, Civil Code, and Law of Commercial Agents and 
 
367 No case to our knowledge has addressed the question of legality of exclusivity.  
368 Parallel imports or gray market goods are genuine goods and not counterfeits whereby trademark is 
misappropriated. See Keith E. Maskus, Parallel Import, 23 World Econ. 1269 (2000). 
369 See Court of Cassation, Journal of Jordanian Bar Association, Case No. 95/1418, page 957 (1996). 
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Intermediaries. The Jordanian legislator should enact a comprehensive commercial agency law 
that governs all aspects of agency.     
The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries gives commercial agency a sweeping 
scope. The law does not distinguish between agencies and other intermediaries. Consequently, a 
broad variety of unsuspecting commercial arrangements may qualify as agencies. The Jordanian 
law should provide a clear definition for each type of intermediaries.  
The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries does not regulate exclusivity. Rather, 
the Jordanian legislator left the exclusivity provision to the agreement of the parties. Rational use 
of exclusive agency may affect competition and consumer welfare. Anti-monopoly enforcement 
agencies should not elevate the short-term pecuniary interests of discrete competitors at the 
expense of competition and consumer welfare. That exclusive agency is lawful remains to be 
tested in courts. If a case arises in the future, courts should uphold exclusive agency. When the 
decision to grant an exclusive agency is made by manufacturer acting in its own self interest, 
consumer welfare could be protected to a greater extent than any ad hoc decision-making by a 
court could secure. A subsidiary rationale for sanctioning exclusive agency is the common-sense 
notion that courts should not provide artificial, non-market incentives for internal expansion, an 
alternative to exclusive agency that will be inefficiently pursued if appointments of exclusive 
agents are met with expense and protracted challenges under the anti-monopoly laws.  
Jordanian courts have exclusive jurisdiction in settling disputes arising out of commercial 
agency contracts. The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries does not permit the use of 
other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration and mediation. Obviously, 
Litigation usually does not help in maintaining healthy relations between the principal and agent. 
The principal and agent must continuously cultivate good personal relationships. Many lawsuits 
are the product of the parties' failure to honestly or sufficiently communicate their expectations 
of each other during the course of their agency relationship. ADR mechanisms help mitigate the 
spillover effects of litigating disputes between principals and agents especially if they are 
engaged in long-term relationships. Therefore, the law should be amended so as to permit the use 
of such mechanisms.      
On balance, Jordan's approach to the use of commercial agents is restrictive. The law sets 
certain conditions for a person to act as an agent. For instance, these conditions relate to 
nationality and registrations. Only Jordanian persons can become agents for foreign principals or 
manufacturers. In addition to the nationality condition, a commercial agent must be duly 
registered at the Commercial Agents Registry of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The purpose 
of registration, among other things, is to keep record of persons acting as agents. As currently 
written, the law does not invalidate an unregistered commercial agent who can practice agency. 
The law should be modified to invalidate unregistered commercial agents so as to protect 
consumers and other third parties whom may deal with the agent.   
        
As far as the contract is concerned, the structure of a commercial agency agreement 
varies considerably. A well-written contract, honest communication by the manufacturer and 
solid justifications for the manufacturer’s business conduct are toward avoiding the filing of a 
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lawsuit to begin with. If still more reforms do prove necessary, the presently suggested 
improvements will give future legislative bodies the background for serious consideration and 
understanding of what, in fact, remains to be done. 
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 Recent Changes to Commercial Agency Law In the Arab Middle East 
Howard Stovall370 
 
 In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the break-down of government control in a 
number of Arab Middle Eastern countries (such as Libya, Syria and Yemen), many multinational 
companies are re-focusing their commercial interests in a smaller regional map, with the 
increasingly important guidance and support of local commercial agents and distributors. 
 In 2004 and 2008, I circulated a summary of important developments in commercial 
agency and distributorship law in the Arab Middle Easti.  The following summary provides an 
update on some significant subsequent changes to commercial agency and distributorship laws in 
the region. 
1.  Egypt 
 Like many legal issues in Egypt, the question of dealer protection rights is somewhat 
confusing, and subject to separate but overlapping laws.  When originally enacted, the Egyptian 
Commercial Code (1999) granted a contract agent the right to claim compensation in the event 
the foreign principal terminated (Article 188) or simply decided not to renew (Article 189) the 
parties' agreement.  More recently, the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court struck down 
Article 189 as unconstitutional, as violating the general principle against perpetual contracts.ii  
Therefore, it is now possible for a foreign principal to allow a contract agency agreement to 
expire at the end of its fixed term and not be liable to the contract agent for compensation under 
Article 189 of the Commercial Code. 
 The Egyptian Commercial Agency Law (1982) did not contain any dealer protections, 
whether for termination or non-renewal of commercial agencies.  However, implementing 
regulations issued by Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade Decree No. 342 (1982) were 
amended in 2005 to allow a registered commercial agent to claim compensation in the event that 
its foreign principal terminated (Article 13 bis (2)) or chose not to renew (Article 13 bis (3)) the 
commercial agency without fault by the commercial agent.  The Egyptian courts have not 
decided whether the Supreme Court's ruling striking down Article 189 of the Commercial Code 
also struck down Article 13 bis (3) of Egyptian Ministerial Decree No. 342. 
 
370 Howard Stovall is a sole practitioner at the Law Office of Howard L. Stovall in Chicago, Illinois. He is an expert 
on Middle East commercial law matters, and has served as an expert on Middle East commercial law for federal 
court proceedings in Florida, Virginia and the District of Columbia, as well as in various international commercial 
arbitration proceedings.  
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 Technically speaking, Egyptian Ministerial Decree No. 342 was issued under the 
Commercial Agency Law rather than the Commercial Code.  Therefore, one could argue that the 
Constitutional Court's judgment on a provision of the Commercial Code should not 
automatically be extended to a similar provision relating to an entirely different law.  However, 
the contrary argument would be that Article 13 bis (3) of Egyptian Ministerial Decree No. 342 
has lost its legitimacy since it also violates the general principle against perpetual contracts.  This 
question has not yet been tested before the Egyptian courts. 
 Another amendment in 2005 to Egyptian Ministerial Decree No. 342 (Article 15 (1) bis) 
allows the Commercial Agency Register to refuse to register another commercial agent until the 
terminated or non-renewed commercial agent has received due compensation and settled any 
disputes it may have with its principal.  There is currently a case pending before the 
Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of this provision. 
2.  Iraq 
 Iraq has enacted a new Commercial Agency Law, Law No. 79 of 2017, repealing the 
Saddam-era commercial agency law, Law No. 51 of 2000.iii  (The Kurdistan region of Iraq has 
not yet considered this new law, and which therefore remains subject to prior commercial agency 
law rules.) 
 Iraqi Law No. 79 expands the definition of commercial agency to which the new law 
applies, including contracts in which a foreign party authorizes an Iraqi party to sell goods, 
products or services in Iraq as a commercial agent, a distributor or a franchisee. 
 Iraqi Law No. 79 requires a commercial agent to obtain a special license in order to 
conduct commercial agency activities, and to register its commercial agencies in a special 
Commercial Agency Register maintained by the Ministry of Trade.  To obtain a license, Article 
4 of Iraqi Law No. 79 requires the applicant to satisfy various requirements, including:  (i) either 
be an Iraqi national (if a natural person) or an Iraqi company wholly-owned by Iraqi nationals, 
(ii) have a business office in Iraq; and (iii) be a member of an Iraqi chamber of commerce. 
 Article 13 of Iraqi Law No. 79 prohibits the import of goods and products, and the 
provision of a foreign company’s services, by the Ministry of Trade (General Company for 
Exhibitions and Commercial Services) and the Ministry of Finance (General 
Customs Authority), except through a commercial agent with a commercial agency contract 
registered in its name for that foreign company with Iraq as its territory.  Prior to Iraqi Law No. 
79, imports were not required to made through registered commercial agents, and there is 
currently some debate locally about the implications of this new rule, e.g., whether it will be 
strictly enforced, or whether a foreign company will be permitted to appoint multiple non-
exclusive commercial agents.iv       
 Prior Iraqi law did not contain any special statutory “dealer protection” governing 
termination (or expiration) of a commercial agency.  In general, such termination (or expiration) 
was governed by the agreement of the contractual parties, and general Iraqi legal rules.  For 
example, Article 946 of the Civil Code states that an agency ends when the fixed period for the 
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agency has expired, when the principal or agent dies, or when the work that is the subject matter 
of the agency agreement is finished.  Article 20 of Iraqi Law No. 79 has now added some 
uncertainty to the situation, stating (in my unofficial translation from the Arabic): 
The principal is not permitted to terminate the agency contract, or to not renew it, unless 
there is a reason justifying its termination or non-renewal.  The agency contract may be 
terminated by mutual consent between the agent and the principal, or according to an 
agreement concluded between the parties on the basis of which the arbitral rules and 
authority, and the applicable law, are determined. 
The Iraqi courts have not yet had occasion to interpret this provision of Iraqi Law No. 79.  
However, it appears that the parties to an Iraqi commercial agency contract have some latitude to 
agree on the terms and conditions for termination/non-renewal (and any resulting compensation), 
including through dispute resolution (arbitration) and choice of governing law clauses. 
3.  Kuwait 
 The previous and long-established (1964) Kuwaiti commercial agency law has been 
replaced by a new Commercial Agency Law, Law No. 13 of 2016v. Among the more significant 
features of Kuwaiti Law No. 13, the definition of commercial agency is expanded to expressly 
include distributors and franchisees. Article 1 defines commercial agency as “every agreement in 
which a party holding the legal right entrusts a merchant or company in Kuwait to sell, promote, 
or distribute goods or products, or provide services, in the capacity of an agent, distributor, 
franchisee or licensee of the producer or the original supplier in exchange for a profit or 
commission.” 
 Under Article 2 of Kuwaiti Law No. 13, a foreign company is permitted to have non-
exclusive commercial agency agreements, and Article 4 further allows parallel imports of goods 
and products even if there is an existing exclusive commercial agent or distributor for such 
goods/products.  However, unless otherwise explicitly agreed by the parties, Article 278 of the 
Kuwaiti Commercial Code still seems to entitle an exclusive commercial agent to remuneration 
when transactions are concluded directly by the principal or a third party within the agent's 
product line and territory, even if such transaction was not concluded as a result of the agent's 
efforts. 
 Article 9 of Kuwaiti Law No. 13 states that the principal may not terminate the 
commercial agency without a breach thereof by the commercial agent, and otherwise the 
principal shall be liable to compensate the agent for the damage it incurred as a result of such 
termination; any agreement to the contrary is expressed to be null and void.  This provision 
appears to broaden the specific “dealer protections” contained in the Kuwaiti Commercial Code, 
such as Articles 281 and 282 applicable to contract agents and exclusive distributors.     
 Finally, Article 20 of Kuwaiti Law No. 13 re-confirms existing law, to the effect that all 
judicial lawsuits arising from the application of the Commercial Agency Law must be heard by 
the Kuwaiti courts.  However, Article 20 also allows the parties to agree to arbitration for the 
settlement of any disputes.vi  
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4.  Oman 
 The Oman Commercial Agencies Law, Royal Decree No. 26 (1977) as amended, is the 
primary Omani law governing the relationship between a foreign principal and an Omani 
commercial agent.  (The Commercial Code, promulgated by Royal Decree No. 55 (1990), also 
contains provisions relevant to commercial agency arrangements.)  The most recent amendments 
to the Omani Commercial Agencies Law, enacted by Royal Decree No. 34 (2014), significantly 
liberalized certain aspects of commercial agency in the country, and opened the Omani market 
for increased free trade and competition.vii 
 For example, until the 2014 amendments, the Omani Commercial Agencies Law had 
stated that if a foreign principal terminated a registered Omani commercial agency agreement 
without justifiable cause, the commercial agent was entitled to “suitable compensation”.  (The 
same rule applied to a principal's decision not to renew a fixed term commercial agency, if the 
commercial agent could also demonstrate that it was successful in distributing and promoting the 
relevant products, and that it would have been deprived of the expected benefit of its efforts as a 
result of the non-renewal.)  The 2014 amendments repealed Article 10 of the Omani Commercial 
Agencies Law, thereby eliminating that express right to such compensation.viii  The parties are 
now free to negotiate the terms of renewal and termination of the commercial agency. 
 However, the 2014 amendments did not change Article 18 of the Omani Commercial 
Agencies Law, which states that the local courts shall decide all disputes between an agent and 
principal regarding the agency contract, and may decide on appropriate compensation depending 
on commercial and local practices (unless the parties have agreed to arbitrate their dispute). 
 The 2014 amendments also repealed Article 5 of the Omani Commercial Agency Law, 
which had allowed the Minister of Commerce to ban the import of goods into Oman that were 
the subject of a registered commercial agency if the principal had unilaterally cancelled the 
commercial agency without justifiable cause. 
 Finally, the 2014 amendments repealed Article 7 of the Omani Commercial Agencies 
Law, which had prohibited a foreign principal from selling or distributing its goods itself or 
through a third party, and gave the registered commercial agent a right to claim commission from 
the principal for any such parallel imports. 
5.  Qatar 
 Qatari Law No. 2 (2016) amended the existing Qatari Commercial Agency Law, Law No. 
8 (2002).  Among the most significant changes, the Qatari Commercial Agency Law is now 
expressly applicable not only to commercial agents but also to exclusive buy-resell distributors.  
Prior to the 2016 amendments, the Qatari Commercial Agency Law was applicable only to 
registered commercial agents who were exclusively authorized to negotiate and conclude 
contracts for the relevant goods or services on behalf of a principal. 
 The 2016 amendments also revise the rules applicable to parallel imports.ix  A registered 
Qatari commercial agent is no longer entitled to claim commission from third parties who import 
products covered by the registered agreement. The registered agent has recourse to its principal 
Middle East Review | Issue No. 3 | November 2019 
 
65 
  
65 
 
for commission on such parallel imports, in accordance with the agreement between them.  (The 
text of this provision seems to allow the principal and agent to agree to a reduced commission, or 
no commission at all, for such parallel imports.) In all cases, no commission will be owed to the 
registered commercial agent for parallel imports intended strictly for the importer’s personal use, 
or for re-export outside Qatar. 
 Unfortunately, the 2016 amendments did not address the strict “dealer protections” 
available to registered commercial agents (and exclusive distributors) in the event that the 
foreign principal decides to terminate (or not renew) their agreement.  Provisions in both the 
Qatari Commercial Agency Law as well as the Qatari Commercial Code (2007) entitle qualified 
commercial agents to make claims for compensation in the event of such termination or non-
renewal. 
*       *        *        * 
 Many of the new commercial agency laws in various Arab countries, as well as the recent 
amendments to commercial agency laws in other Arab countries, seek to restrict the formation of 
monopolies, encourage free trade and foster competition, and secure the availability of goods and 
services at reasonable prices.x  In that sense, this legislation is encouraging a liberalization of 
local markets.  In many instances, however, these new laws and amendments have also expanded 
the range of commercial arrangements (agency, distributorship, franchise) that are subject to 
“dealer protection” rights entitling local parties to compensation in the event of termination or 
non-renewal of their agreements.   
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